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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation explores the link between corporate governance and corporate 
entrepreneurship.  Surprisingly, our understanding of how boards of directors influence 
corporate entrepreneurship decisions and actions has been limited to date.  To address 
this gap, the current study develops a resource dependence theoretical framework to 
investigate how corporations leverage directors’ experience and networks to enhance 
organizational rejuvenation efforts.  Entrepreneurial orientation also is examined as a 
contextual factor in the director capital-corporate entrepreneurship relationship.  After 
collecting an original dataset of 2,289 firm-year observations from 524 U.S. corporations 
and creating a new measure of organizational rejuvenation, I implemented a hybrid 
methodological approach to simultaneously test the within- and between-firm influences 
of the variables of interest.  The analytical results demonstrate surprising reverse effects 
of director human capital, social capital, and the contextual influence of entrepreneurial 
orientation on firms’ corporate entrepreneurship initiatives.  These findings support prior 
theoretical arguments that directors serve a dual role:  not only monitoring and 
controlling firm decisions but also serving an important advice and counsel function. 
  
iv 
APPROVAL PAGE 
 
 
 
The faculty listed below, appointed by the Dean of the Henry W. Bloch School of 
Management, have examined a dissertation titled “The Influence of Director Human and 
Social Capital and Firms’ Entrepreneurial Orientation on Corporate Entrepreneurship,” 
presented by Andrew C. Burkemper, candidate for the Doctor of Philosophy degree, and 
certify that in their opinion it is worthy of acceptance. 
 
Supervisory Committee 
 
Jeffrey S. Hornsby, Ph.D., Committee Chair 
Department of Global Entrepreneurship and Innovation 
 
Mark E. Parry, Ph.D. 
Department of Global Entrepreneurship and Innovation 
 
Ishrat Ali, Ph.D. 
Department of Global Entrepreneurship and Innovation 
 
Brian S. Anderson, Ph.D. 
Department of Global Entrepreneurship and Innovation 
 
Dirk Libaers, Ph.D. 
D’Amore-McKim School of Business, Northeastern University
v 
CONTENTS 
 
ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................... iii 
 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS .......................................................................................... viii 
 
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................ ix 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................x 
 
CHAPTER 
 
1. INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................................1 
 
   A Practical Example ........................................................................................................6 
 
2. THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
   Introduction ......................................................................................................................9 
 
   Importance of Corporate Entrepreneurship .....................................................................9 
 
   Antecedents and Outcomes of Corporate Entrepreneurship ..........................................11 
 
   The Two Domains of Corporate Entrepreneurship .......................................................13 
 
         Corporate Venturing Domain ..................................................................................13 
 
         Strategic Entrepreneurship Domain .........................................................................15 
 
   Organizational Rejuvenation .........................................................................................19 
 
   Director Human Capital, Social Capital, and Corporate Entrepreneurship ...................21 
 
   Resource Dependence Theory .......................................................................................23 
 
   The Relationship between Director Capital and Organizational Rejuvenation .............28 
 
         Director Human Capital ...........................................................................................28 
 
         Director Social Capital ............................................................................................30 
 
   The Moderating Role of Entrepreneurial Orientation ...................................................32
vi 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
 
   Introduction ....................................................................................................................37 
 
   Data Collection and Sample ..........................................................................................37 
 
   Dependent Variable – Organizational Rejuvenation .....................................................40 
 
   Predictor Variables ........................................................................................................48 
 
         Director Human Capital ...........................................................................................48 
 
         Director Social Capital ............................................................................................49 
 
         Entrepreneurial Orientation .....................................................................................50 
 
   Control Variables ...........................................................................................................52 
 
4. ANALYIS AND RESULTS 
 
   Introduction ....................................................................................................................54 
 
   Model Specification .......................................................................................................54 
 
   Results of Hypotheses Tests ..........................................................................................57 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
   Introduction ....................................................................................................................63 
 
   Discussion of Findings ..................................................................................................63 
 
         Director Capital and Organizational Rejuvenation ..................................................64 
 
         Director Capital, Entrepreneurial Orientation, and Organizational Rejuvenation ..66 
 
   Implications ...................................................................................................................68 
 
   Limitations and Future Research ...................................................................................71 
 
   Conclusion .....................................................................................................................74 
 
vii 
LIST OF REFERENCES ..................................................................................................75 
 
VITA .................................................................................................................................86 
 
viii 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
 
Figure              Page 
 
1.  Model of studied relationships .....................................................................................28 
 
2.  Interaction of DevConcurrent and DevEO on organizational rejuvenation ................62 
 
3.  Average marginal effect of DevConcurrent on organizational rejuvenation 
     across level of DevEO .................................................................................................62 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ix 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
Table              Page 
 
1.  Prior definitions of corporate entrepreneurship ...........................................................14 
 
2.  The five constructs of strategic entrepreneurship ........................................................16 
 
3.  Examples of organizational rejuvenation ....................................................................20 
 
4.  Prior definitions of corporate governance ...................................................................25 
 
5.  Prior definitions of entrepreneurial orientation ...........................................................33 
 
6.  Global Industry Classification Standard industry groups and codes ...........................39 
 
7.  Summary statistics and correlation matrix ..................................................................41 
 
8.  Conceptual domain of the organizational rejuvenation construct ...............................45 
 
9.  Organizational rejuvenation measure for fiscal year 2014 ..........................................47 
 
10.  Group mean and group-mean centered variables for Abbott Laboratories ...............56 
 
11.  Results of hybrid approach ........................................................................................59 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 x 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
Seventeen years ago, I began a relatively straight-forward assignment in my 
freshman English course at St. Dominic High School.  Ms. Frazier tasked us with 
researching two careers in the Occupational Outlook Handbook that we would love to 
pursue down the road.  I am so thankful to be experiencing the joys of one of these 
careers as an Assistant Professor, and time will tell if I ever become a famous news 
anchor.  I will always reflect back on that one-week project as a high school freshman 
and be grateful for Ms. Frazier’s guidance and encouragement to achieve our dreams. 
I have learned invaluable lessons from exceptional teachers throughout my life 
and hope to live up to their examples in my own classroom.  Thank you to Ms. Saeger, 
Ms. Lammert, Ms. McGuire, Ms. Walters, Ms. Hagedorn, Mr. Matthews, Mr. Haug, Fr. 
Lane, Ms. Batenhorst, Dr. Rohlf, Dr. Sronce, Dr. Taylor, Dr. Taylor, Dr. Wyatt, Dr. 
Dobies, Professor Hudson, and many others who (put up with me and) inspired me to 
follow this path.  I also am grateful for the support, guidance, and laughs provided by my 
professors, colleagues, and fellow doctoral students at the University of Missouri–
Kansas City, in particular my office partners-in-crime Hessam Sarooghi and Ben 
Williams. 
To the members of my dissertation committee, a sincere thank you for pushing, 
challenging, and encouraging me to aim high, work hard, and persevere.  Thank you 
Mark for challenging me to step back and consider the bigger picture on many 
occasions.  Thank you Ishrat for reassuring me that I am on the right path and keeping
 xi 
 
me focused on being an excellent educator.  Thank you Dirk for taking me under your 
wing from day one, teaching me how to navigate the publication process, and reminding 
me to enjoy every day.  Thank you Brian for believing in me, serving as an incredible 
mentor and coach, and investing so fully in my academic pursuits.  Thank you Jeff for 
the invaluable mentorship, friendship, and life advice during the past three years.  I will 
always be grateful for how much you have taught me about research, teaching, service, 
leadership, and integrity.  I look forward to your continued mentorship and friendship for 
the remainder of my career. 
To my family, thank you for being my rock.  Mom and Dad, you have given me 
every opportunity in life.  I so greatly appreciate the sacrifices you have made and the 
example you have provided.  I love you to the moon and back… see what I did there?  
Mike and Sarah, I am incredibly proud of the people you have become.  Thank you for 
your love and support. 
To my wife and best friend, Kami, you mean the world to me.  This crazy ride 
was only possible with your encouragement, patience, and love.  Thank you for the 
tremendous sacrifices and life changes that you have made for our family.  You are an 
incredible wife and an even better mom to our two boys, Tyler and Eli.  I cannot wait to 
see where life takes us next.  I love you. 
 1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Does a public corporation’s board of directors matter for building an 
entrepreneurial company?  Can corporations leverage directors’ experience and networks 
to be more entrepreneurial?  Or, do directors only monitor and control executive 
decisions to protect shareholder interests?  Too often, researchers and practitioners only 
consider the board’s oversight function (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Johnson, Daily, and 
Ellstrand, 1996).  However, directors also offer key resources through their advice and 
counsel role (Daily, Dalton, and Cannella, 2003; Hillman, Withers, and Collins, 2009).  
One aspect of corporate entrepreneurship focuses on rejuvenating internal structures and 
processes to improve competitive standing (Covin and Miles, 1999).  This organizational 
rejuvenation is a large undertaking for established firms.  Thus, corporations should 
benefit from involving directors in the decision-making process.  Otherwise, firms leave 
potential resources on the boardroom table. 
 Resource dependence theory emphasizes how the board of directors links the 
firm to the external environment and facilitates organizational changes (Hillman, 
Cannella, and Paetzold, 2000).  Prior research has used a resource dependence 
framework to investigate directors’ influence on firm performance (Hillman, 2005; 
Martin, Gozubuyuk, and Becerra, 2015; Nicholson and Kiel, 2007); however, it has 
largely overlooked how directors may affect the firm’s corporate entrepreneurship 
initiatives (Corbett, Covin, O’Connor, and Tucci, 2013; Phan, Wright, Ucbasaran, and 
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Tan, 2009).  Additional exploration of the corporate governance-corporate 
entrepreneurship link can uncover important nuances in board composition and 
corporate entrepreneurial efforts.  I investigate this link by focusing on director capital 
and organizational rejuvenation. 
 Organizational rejuvenation focuses on internal corporate entrepreneurship 
(Covin and Miles, 1999).  Decision-makers assess and revamp the inner-workings of the 
corporation to make it more flexible and entrepreneurial.  This internal innovation of 
processes, structures, and capabilities can improve business strategy execution and lead 
to better competitive standing and performance (Covin and Miles, 1999).  Firms 
implement organizational rejuvenation by altering major aspects of internal operations to 
deliver on existing corporate strategies (Dess, Ireland, Zahra, Floyd, Janney, and Lane, 
2003).  In this dissertation, I argue that director human capital and social capital have a 
meaningful influence on the firm’s organizational rejuvenation decisions.  Director 
human capital includes the experiences and skills that board members bring to the 
decision-making process (Johnson, Schnatterly, and Hill, 2013).  Director social capital 
refers to board members’ social relationships – including ties to other firms, personal 
relationships with corporate leaders, and social standing – that affect the decision-
making process (Johnson et al., 2013).  For public corporations, directors are charged to 
bring their experiences and connections to the boardroom to discuss and influence 
corporate decisions.  Organizational rejuvenation can be one of these important 
decisions from which the corporation benefits by including directors in the discussion. 
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 The investigation of these specific variables contributes to the broader corporate 
entrepreneurship and corporate governance research areas.  First, prior researchers 
divide corporate entrepreneurship into the two primary domains of corporate venturing 
and strategic entrepreneurship (Morris, Kuratko, and Covin, 2010).  Corporate venturing 
includes the creation, addition, or investment in new businesses; strategic 
entrepreneurship focuses on large-scale corporate innovations that facilitate a sustainable 
competitive advantage over the long-term (Kuratko and Audretsch, 2013).  
Organizational rejuvenation is one of the five constructs of strategic entrepreneurship 
(the remaining four constructs are sustained regeneration, strategic renewal, domain 
redefinition, and business model reconstruction) (Morris, Kuratko, and Covin, 2007).  Of 
these five, organizational rejuvenation is the sole construct that focuses on internal 
innovations.  Prior research has largely addressed the external constructs, particularly 
strategic renewal (Agarwal and Helfat, 2009), so a deeper dive into organizational 
rejuvenation can provide a strong contribution to the corporate entrepreneurship 
literature. 
 Second, prior researchers divide corporate governance into the four predominant 
streams of agency theory, stewardship theory, stakeholder theory, and resource 
dependence theory (Daily et al., 2003; Nicholson and Kiel, 2007).  Agency theory 
addresses the conflicting interests of shareholders and managers resulting from the 
separation of ownership and control.  Thus, the primary role of the board is to monitor 
managers’ actions and decisions to protect shareholder interests (Daily et al., 2003; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  Stewardship theory, on the other hand, frames directors and 
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managers as stewards whose motives are aligned with those of shareholders (Davis, 
Schoorman, and Donaldson, 1997).  In this view, directors and managers understand that 
serving shareholders’ interests also serves their own interests (Daily et al., 2003).  Next, 
stakeholder theory focuses on the nature of the corporation’s relationships with many 
constituent groups and how these relationships affect managerial decision making 
(Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984; Jones and Wicks, 1999).  In this view, no 
particular stakeholder group is predominant over other stakeholders, instead positing that 
the interests of all stakeholder groups have intrinsic value (Jones and Wicks, 1999). 
Finally, resource dependence theory posits that directors provide access to resources that 
the firm requires (Daily et al., 2003; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  Thus, directors 
influence the firm’s decision-making process through the resources that they bring to 
bear.  Director human capital and social capital are two of these resources provided by 
board members.  Prior corporate governance research has largely addressed director 
demographics, board size, board independence, and CEO duality through agency, 
stewardship, and stakeholder theoretical frameworks (Daily et al., 2003) but has lacked 
attention to resource dependence theory.  Therefore, a closer look at director human and 
social capital using a resource dependence framework can provide a meaningful 
contribution to the corporate governance literature. 
 Why is it important to investigate the link between corporate governance and 
corporate entrepreneurship?  Currently, there is a gap in understanding how the firm’s 
corporate governance and structure choices can affect the implementation of corporate 
entrepreneurship initiatives (Corbett et al., 2013).  “Scholarly investigation of how 
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organizations can attract, cultivate, and manage human capital in a way that allows for 
continuous corporate entrepreneurship efforts within the corporation” is an important 
area for future research (Corbett et al., 2013).  Phan et al. (2009) agree that the link 
between corporate governance and corporate entrepreneurship has lacked examination 
by prior studies, calling for a better understanding of how the composition of boards of 
directors and the role of outside directors can enable corporate entrepreneurial efforts.  
Further, it has been suggested that future research pertaining to corporate 
entrepreneurship should focus less on tangible assets such as physical, financial, and 
labor resources – areas that have already received a great deal of attention – and instead 
should focus more on intangible assets such as human, social, and intellectual capital 
(Dess et al., 2003). 
 Given these calls to advance our understanding of the link between corporate 
governance and corporate entrepreneurship, this dissertation argues for the importance of 
director human and social capital in fostering organizational rejuvenation within the 
organization.  It also investigates how entrepreneurial orientation serves as an important 
contextual factor.  Entrepreneurial orientation – previously defined as an organization’s 
processes, practices, and decision-making activities that lead to new entry (Lumpkin and 
Dess, 1996) and that capture a firm’s commitment to innovation, proactiveness, and risk 
taking (Zahra and Neubaum, 1998) – has been shown to result from the behaviors and 
attitudes of individuals and organizations (Anderson, Kreiser, Kuratko, Hornsby, and 
Eshima, 2015) and also has been argued as an important stimulant to effective corporate 
entrepreneurship (Dess and Lumpkin, 2005).  Thus, prior research has provided initial 
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evidence of the contextual role that entrepreneurial orientation plays in the relationship 
between corporate governance and corporate entrepreneurship.  The following research 
question serves as the motivation for this dissertation: 
 What is the role of director human and social capital in facilitating 
 organizational rejuvenation and how does the entrepreneurial orientation of the 
 firm moderate this relationship? 
 
A Practical Example 
 Before moving on to the next chapter, a practical example from a major 
corporation highlights this link between corporate governance and corporate 
entrepreneurship.  Recent decisions made at Microsoft Corporation present a relevant 
case study.  It is clear that large, entrepreneurial corporations (e.g., Google, Apple, 
Amazon, Samsung) have emerged as ruthless competitors in recent years while 
Microsoft has continued to miss many short-term opportunities and has struggled to 
improve its rate of innovation (Kempin, 2013).  Some argue that Microsoft’s difficulties 
have occurred, in part, due to its board of directors being dominated by founders and 
seasoned company executives who have focused more on financial and procedural issues 
than long-term strategy and innovation (Kempin, 2013).  To truly turn the firm around, it 
has been suggested that “Microsoft’s shareholders need to overhaul their board and elect 
directors with technology foresight who will force the changes needed in the company’s 
senior leadership team” (Kempin, 2013).  In 2014, the firm did just that (Keizer, 2014). 
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 The first major change occurred in early 2014 when Satya Nadella, a 22-year 
veteran of the company, replaced Steve Ballmer as Chief Executive Officer of Microsoft 
Corporation, concurrent with Bill Gates stepping down as the Chairman of the Board 
and becoming a regular director.  The 2014 Board of Directors Letter to Shareholders  
discussed the CEO role as “demanding, requiring mastery of complex, rapidly evolving 
business models and the ability to lead a highly technical organization… into its next 
chapter of innovation and growth” (Microsoft, 2014).  Further, the letter discussed how 
the firm “regularly adds directors to infuse new ideas and fresh perspectives in the 
boardroom… to create a balanced Board with diverse viewpoints, deep expertise, and a 
strong technology-specific knowledge base” (Microsoft, 2014). 
 Nadella immediately focused on overhauling the current board of directors, 
creating the biggest change to the board since Microsoft went public in 1986 (Keizer, 
2014).  Four well-established directors who were on the board when Nadella was named 
the new CEO departed Microsoft by the end of the year, making room for five new 
directors (including Nadella).  Fifty percent of the board turned over in less than one 
year.  The new directors included the Chief Executive Officer of Visa, the Chief 
Financial Officer of Kraft Foods Group, the President of ValueAct Capital, and a global 
wireless industry pioneer.  Nadella targeted these individuals for their global commerce 
and enterprise technology expertise, financial and operational experience, investment 
expertise, and deep experience in the consumer, retail, and mobile communications 
industries (Microsoft, 2014).  The board overhaul clearly was made to reorient the 
organization’s strategy toward entrepreneurial and innovative actions.  “The moves are 
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intended to reinvigorate growth at a company that’s struggled to adapt to the rise of 
mobile devices, away from the shrinking personal computing arena” (Jinks and Bass, 
2014).  These dramatic changes at Microsoft Corporation provide just one example of 
the critical role that directors can have in creating a more entrepreneurial and innovative 
environment and stronger focus on corporate entrepreneurship.  The remainder of this 
dissertation is structured as follows: 
 Chapter 2 provides the theoretical development for the relationship between 
director capital, entrepreneurial orientation, and organizational rejuvenation and also 
introduces the model and hypotheses of the dissertation.  Chapter 3 transitions to the 
research method, providing information on the sample, data collection, and measures for 
the dependent and predictor variables.  Chapter 4 highlights the model specification and 
results of the empirical testing.  Finally, Chapter 5 provides a broader discussion of the 
results, implications for theory and practice, limitations of the current study, and 
suggestions for future research. 
 
  
 9 
 
CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
Introduction 
 This chapter advances the theoretical justification for the relationship between 
director capital, entrepreneurial orientation, and organizational rejuvenation.  It begins 
by highlighting the importance of corporate entrepreneurship and then transitions to the 
antecedents and outcomes of corporate entrepreneurship.  After laying this groundwork, 
the next section discusses the two domains of corporate entrepreneurship:  corporate 
venturing and strategic entrepreneurship.  Organizational rejuvenation fits in the 
strategic entrepreneurship domain, and I devote the following section to it.  The next 
section discusses how director human and social capital fit with corporate 
entrepreneurship.  I then develop resource dependence theory as an appropriate 
theoretical framework for the relationships of interest.  The final sections discuss the 
relationships between variables and offer the hypotheses to be tested in subsequent 
stages. 
 
Importance of Corporate Entrepreneurship 
 “Entrepreneurial thinking and acting is changing the way business is conducted 
at every level… Companies cannot be static – they must continually adjust, adapt, and 
redefine themselves” (Morris et al., 2010, p. 3).  Indeed, entrepreneurship and innovation 
– from new start-ups and established corporations alike – remain the driving forces for 
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the United States economy and countries all over the world (Marcus and Dent, 2015).  
During the 21st century in particular, corporate entrepreneurship has become critical for 
established companies to combat problems related to rapid growth in the number of new 
competitors, ineffective traditional management approaches, the departure of top 
employees for more innovative roles, and issues with productivity and efficiency 
(Kuratko, 2013).  Corporate entrepreneurs have been acknowledged as important drivers 
of organizational performance by recognizing opportunities, developing a team, bringing 
together resources, and creating something valuable (Brush, 2014). 
 Corporate entrepreneurship has been identified as a critical factor for high levels 
of organizational performance (Covin, Slevin, and Heeley, 2000; Hornsby, Kuratko, 
Shepherd, and Bott, 2009; Kuratko, Montagno, and Hornsby, 1990; Zahra, 1991; Zahra 
and Covin, 1995).  Established organizations can leverage a corporate entrepreneurship 
strategy to maintain a competitive advantage over rival firms (Corbett et al., 2013; Covin 
and Kuratko, 2010; Ireland, Hitt, and Sirmon, 2003) by rejuvenating, renewing, and 
redefining organizations, markets, and industries (Covin and Miles, 1999).  By 
diversifying inputs and outputs through internal development, firms focus on piecing 
together new resource combinations to extend their competencies and to pursue new 
opportunities (Burgelman, 1983).  This commitment to creating new business 
opportunities through product innovation, process innovation, market developments, and 
strategic renewal improves firms’ competitive standing and financial performance 
(Zahra, 1991). 
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Antecedents and Outcomes of Corporate Entrepreneurship 
 Previous literature has provided a wealth of frameworks for the antecedents and 
outcomes of corporate entrepreneurship.  The construct has been investigated at length 
as both an independent and dependent variable in the literature, allowing for multiple 
testing scenarios in which corporate entrepreneurship either influences key variables or 
is influenced by other variables.  In perhaps the most complete summation to date, 
Ireland, Covin, and Kuratko (2009) synthesized three decades of prior research, 
including nine theoretical models, in their conceptualization of corporate 
entrepreneurship strategy.  This model incorporates the antecedents, elements, and 
outcomes of corporate entrepreneurship strategy.  The antecedents include external 
environmental conditions and individual entrepreneurial cognitions.  The elements 
consist of an entrepreneurial strategic vision, a pro-entrepreneurship organizational 
architecture, and entrepreneurial processes and behavior.  Important outcomes include 
competitive capability and strategic repositioning.  This article provides an excellent 
jumping-off point for future research efforts focused on corporate entrepreneurship. 
 Hitt, Ireland, Sirmon, and Trahms (2011) provided a similar input-process-output 
model specific to strategic entrepreneurship, piecing together the resource inputs, 
orchestration processes, and multilevel outcomes that are central components of the 
strategic entrepreneurship construct.  The authors state that strategic entrepreneurship 
helps firms to “create and sustain a competitive advantage while simultaneously 
identifying and exploiting new opportunities” (Hitt et al., 2011, p. 57).  The inputs of the 
model include environmental factors, organizational resources, and individual resources.  
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The orchestration processes consist of structuring, bundling, leveraging, and value 
creation and appropriation.  Important outputs include value creation for customers, 
competitive advantage, wealth creation, and benefits for individuals, the organization, 
and society. 
 A final noteworthy review of the antecedents and outcomes of corporate 
entrepreneurship was provided by Zahra, Randerson, and Fayolle (2013), in which they 
discussed the evolution and contributions of prior literature.  Important antecedents to 
corporate entrepreneurship include national cultures (Hayton, George, and Zahra, 2002), 
industry conditions (Zahra, 1991, 1993, 1996a), organizational structure (Covin and 
Slevin, 1988; Zahra, 1991), organizational culture (Zahra, 1991), incentives (Zahra, 
1991), managerial systems (Zahra, 1991), and firm ownership (Zahra, 1996a).  Other 
internal organizational factors that influence corporate entrepreneurship activity include 
management support, work discretion, rewards and reinforcement, time availability, and 
organizational boundaries (Hornsby, Kuratko, and Zahra, 2002).  On the other side, 
critical outcomes of corporate entrepreneurship include competitive advantage, 
organizational performance, profitability and growth (Zahra, 1991, 1993, 1996b), 
organizational learning (Yang, Narayanan, and Zahra, 2009), knowledge creation 
(Dushnitsky and Shaver, 2009), and the development of capabilities (Sapienza, Autio, 
George, and Zahra, 2006; Yiu, Lau, & Bruton, 2007; Zahra, Nielsen, and Bogner, 1999).  
Now that I have highlighted where corporate entrepreneurship fits in the larger 
theoretical framework, I will discuss the two distinct domains of corporate 
entrepreneurship. 
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The Two Domains of Corporate Entrepreneurship 
 Various definitions of corporate entrepreneurship have been suggested in the 
literature over the years (see Table 1).  Initial conceptualizations of corporate 
entrepreneurship included two distinct phenomena:  corporate venturing and strategic 
renewal.  Corporate venturing creates new businesses within established organizations, 
whereas strategic renewal enacts significant changes to organizations’ strategies or 
structures (Guth and Ginsberg, 1990; Sharma and Chrisman, 1999).  Morris et al. (2010) 
more recently built upon these phenomena by proposing two primary domains of 
corporate entrepreneurship:  (1) corporate venturing and (2) strategic entrepreneurship. 
 
Corporate Venturing Domain 
 Corporate venturing involves the creation, addition, or investment in new 
businesses (Kuratko and Audretsch, 2013; Morris et al., 2010) and is divided into three 
primary methods.  Internal corporate venturing is an approach in which new businesses 
are created and owned by the corporation, and these new businesses may either be 
included within the current corporate structure or be housed outside of the corporation as 
semi-autonomous units.  External corporate venturing occurs when the corporation 
invests in or acquires new businesses outside of the current company.  Often, these new 
businesses are young start-ups or early growth-stage firms that compete directly with the 
corporation or add valuable talent and resources to the established organization.  The 
third method, cooperative corporate venturing, occurs when new businesses are jointly 
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created and owned by the corporation along with external partners or companies.  All 
three of these methods focus on new business creation. 
 
Table 1. Prior definitions of corporate entrepreneurship 
Burgelman, 1983 “The process whereby firms engage in diversification through 
internal development. Such diversification requires new 
resource combinations to extend the firm’s activities in areas 
unrelated, or marginally related, to its current domain of 
competence and corresponding opportunity set” (p. 1349). 
 
Guth and Ginsberg, 
1990 
“Corporate entrepreneurship encompasses two types of 
phenomena and the processes surrounding them: (1) the birth 
of new businesses within existing organizations, i.e. internal 
innovation or venturing; and (2) the transformation of 
organizations through renewal of the key ideas on which they 
are built, i.e. strategic renewal” (p. 5). 
 
Zahra, 1991 “Corporate entrepreneurship refers to formal and informal 
activities aimed at creating new business in established 
companies through product and process innovations and 
market developments. These activities may take place at the 
corporate, division (business), functional, or project levels, 
with the unifying objective of improving a company’s 
competitive position and financial performance. Corporate 
entrepreneurship also entails the strategic renewal of an 
existing business.” (p. 262). 
 
Covin and Miles, 
1999 
“Corporate entrepreneurship is engaged in to increase 
competitiveness through efforts aimed at the rejuvenation, 
renewal, and redefinition of organizations, their markets, or 
industries. Corporate entrepreneurship revitalizes, 
reinvigorates, and reinvents. It is the spark and catalyst that is 
intended to place firms on the path to competitive superiority 
or keep them in competitively advantageous positions” (p. 50). 
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Sharma and 
Chrisman, 1999 
“Corporate entrepreneurship is the process whereby an 
individual or a group of individuals, in association with an 
existing organization, create a new organization or instigate 
renewal or innovation within that organization… Strategic 
renewal refers to the corporate entrepreneurial efforts that 
result in significant changes to an organization's business or 
corporate level strategy or structure… Corporate venturing 
refers to corporate entrepreneurial efforts that lead to the 
creation of new business organizations within the corporate 
organization” (p. 18-19). 
 
Zahra, Neubaum, 
and Huse, 2000 
“CE, the sum of a company’s venturing and innovation 
activities (Guth & Ginsberg, 1990), can help the firm acquire 
new capabilities (Stopford & Baden-Fuller, 1994) and improve 
its performance (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996)” (p. 947). 
 
Ireland, Covin, and 
Kuratko, 2009 
“We define CE strategy as a vision-directed, organization-wide 
reliance on entrepreneurial behavior that purposefully and 
continuously rejuvenates the organization and shapes the scope 
of its operations through the recognition and exploitation of 
entrepreneurial opportunity” (p. 21). 
 
Phan, Wright, 
Ucbasaran, and Tan, 
2009 
“Corporate entrepreneurship (CE) refers to the process of 
organizational renewal and relates to two distinct but related 
phenomena (Guth and Ginsberg, 1990). First is innovation and 
corporate venturing (CV) activities… Second, CE embodies 
renewal activities that enhance a corporation’s ability to 
compete and take risks, which may or may not involve the 
addition of new businesses to a corporation… It may involve 
strategic renewal, sustained regeneration, domain redefinition, 
organizational rejuvenation, and business model reconstruction 
(Covin and Miles, 1999)” (p. 198-199). 
  
 
Strategic Entrepreneurship Domain 
 Strategic entrepreneurship, on the other hand, focuses on “organizationally 
consequential innovations that are adopted in the pursuit of competitive advantage” 
(Kuratko and Audretsch, 2013).  It takes a broader approach than new business creation, 
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focusing instead on large-scale innovations inside and outside the firm that enhance 
organizational performance over the long-term.  This domain is comprised of five 
constructs:  (1) sustained regeneration, (2) organizational rejuvenation, (3) strategic 
renewal, (4) domain redefinition, and (5) business model reconstruction.  The first four 
constructs were proposed by Covin and Miles (1999) as the forms of corporate 
entrepreneurship, and business model reconstruction has since been proposed as the fifth 
construct of strategic entrepreneurship (Morris et al., 2007).  Table 2 provides a 
summary of these five constructs of strategic entrepreneurship. 
 
Table 2. The five constructs of strategic entrepreneurship (Covin and Miles, 1999; 
Morris, Kuratko, and Covin, 2007) 
Construct Key Goals and Attributes 
Basis for Competitive 
Advantage 
1. Sustained 
regeneration 
Focus: new products or new 
markets. Regularly and 
continuously introduce new 
products and services or enter new 
markets. Embrace change and 
willingly challenge competitors in 
battles for market share. 
Capitalizes on latent or 
under-exploited market 
opportunities using the 
firm’s valued innovation-
producing competencies. 
2. Organizational 
rejuvenation 
Focus: the organization. Sustain or 
improve competitive standing by 
altering internal processes, 
structures, or capabilities. The focus 
and target of innovation is the 
organization itself. 
 
Creates value for the firm’s 
customers and sustains/ 
improves the firm’s ability 
to effectively implement its 
chosen strategy. 
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Construct Key Goals and Attributes 
Basis for Competitive 
Advantage 
3. Strategic  
renewal 
Focus: environmental context and 
strategy. Redefine the 
organization’s relationship with its 
markets or industry competitors by 
fundamentally altering how it 
competes. The focal point is the 
firm within its environmental 
context. New business strategies 
differ significantly from past 
practices. 
Better leverages the firm’s 
resources or more fully 
exploits available product-
market opportunities. 
Deliberate and major 
repositioning actions 
energize the firm and 
redefine its competitive 
strategy and industry 
position. 
4. Domain 
redefinition 
Focus: creation and exploitation. 
Proactively create a new product-
market arena that others have not 
recognized or actively sought to 
exploit. 
Takes the competition to a 
new arena where the 
organization’s first or early 
mover status could create a 
sustainable competitive 
advantage. 
5. Business 
model 
reconstruction 
Focus: core business models.  
Redesign core business models to 
differentiate the firm from 
competitors in the industry. 
Reassesses current 
capabilities and revamps 
the value proposition for 
customers. 
 
 Sustained regeneration focuses on regularly introducing new products or services 
and entering new markets to exploit under-developed market opportunities (Covin and 
Miles, 1999).  Firms employing an approach of sustained regeneration tend to support 
innovation, embrace change, and challenge competing firms for market share.  One of 
the main goals of sustained regeneration is to gain a competitive advantage in existing 
markets – either a firm’s current market or an existing market new to the firm – by 
quickly learning and adapting to the market and the organization’s competitors (Dess et 
al., 2003). 
 Strategic renewal involves a fundamental alteration of how the organization 
competes and how it interacts with industry competitors and markets (Covin and Miles, 
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1999).  Firms focused on strategic renewal tend to develop new business strategies 
significantly different from past practices, take deliberate repositioning actions, and 
leverage the firm’s resources differently or more fully to exploit other product-market 
opportunities.  One of the main goals of strategic renewal is to revitalize the firm by 
creating strategies that align the organization with its external environment (Covin and 
Miles, 1999) and by repositioning itself to exploit current competitive advantages while 
exploring for new advantages for future success (Dess et al., 2003; Ireland, Hitt, and 
Vaidyanath, 2002). 
 Domain redefinition focuses on proactively creating a new product-market arena 
that others have not yet recognized or sought to exploit (Covin and Miles, 1999).  Firms 
employing an approach of domain redefinition tend to exploit market opportunities in a 
preemptive fashion, create the early structure of an industry, and completely redefine 
how the competitive process will unfold.  One of the main goals of domain redefinition 
is to establish first mover advantages by exploring what is possible versus exploiting 
what is already available (Dess et al., 2003). 
 Business model reconstruction involves the redesign of a firm’s core business 
models to make operations more efficient or to differentiate the organization from 
competitors in the industry (Kuratko and Audretsch, 2009).  Firms focused on business 
model reconstruction tend to reassess their current capabilities and how they might 
revamp the value proposition for their customers (Miles, Munilla, and Darroch, 2009).  
One of the main goals of business model reconstruction is to focus on who the true 
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customers are, what they value, and how value can be delivered at reasonable costs 
(Kuratko and Audretsch, 2009; Magretta, 2002). 
 The next section discusses the strategic entrepreneurship variable of interest for 
this dissertation, organizational rejuvenation. 
 
Organizational Rejuvenation 
 I define organizational rejuvenation as the firm’s ongoing changes to internal 
structures, processes, and capabilities to improve strategy execution (Covin and Miles, 
1999; Dess et al., 2003; Kuratko and Audretsch, 2009).  One of the main goals of 
organizational rejuvenation is to become more entrepreneurial through processes and 
structures by implementing internal and administrative innovations rather than external 
product or service innovations (Dess et al., 2003).  The target of innovation is the 
organization itself (Covin and Miles, 1999).  This makes organizational rejuvenation 
unique from the other constructs of strategic entrepreneurship, which focus on 
entrepreneurial efforts external to the firm.  Corporations do not need to completely 
overhaul their firm-level strategies, markets pursued, or product lines in order to be 
entrepreneurial (Kuratko and Audretsch, 2009).  Rather, implementing changes to 
internal business structures or major aspects of operations within the firm can facilitate 
strategy execution and improve competitive standing (Dess et al., 2003).  Firms also 
pursue organizational rejuvenation by reallocating internal resources and reconfiguring 
the firm’s value chain (Covin and Miles, 1999).  It can involve a fundamental redesign 
of the entire corporation, major restructuring efforts, or administrative innovations that 
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improve organizational flexibility, efficiency, or communication across units (Kuratko 
and Audretsch, 2009).  Firms employing organizational rejuvenation introduce new 
process innovations to create and exploit opportunities (Kreiser and Davis, 2009; 
Stopford & Baden-Fuller, 1990).  Organizational rejuvenation can stem from intended or 
emergent change, minor or complete rearrangement of organizational structure, and top-
down or bottom-up initiation (Adenfelt and Lagerstrom, 2006).  Table 3 provides 
examples of organizational rejuvenation efforts that firms can implement when altering 
their internal structures, processes, and capabilities.  The following section highlights 
how directors influence corporate entrepreneurship decision-making as a result of their 
human and social capital. 
 
Table 3. Examples of organizational rejuvenation 
Internal Structures  Realign or create new business segments/divisions 
(Adenfelt and Lagerstrom, 2006; Kuratko and Audretsch, 
2009). 
 Reconfigure the firm’s internal value chain (Covin and 
Miles, 1999; Dess et al., 2003). 
 Formalize cross-functional teams to facilitate problem 
solving and communication (Kuratko and Audretsch, 
2009). 
 Introduce a flatter organizational chart to improve 
communication to and from the top. 
 Reallocate internal resources to remain flexible (Covin and 
Miles, 1999). 
 Implement a lean workforce through remote working 
arrangements, flexible schedules, or contract positions. 
Internal Processes  Reevaluate and change a major aspect of internal 
operations (Covin and Miles, 1999; Dess et al., 2003). 
 Create formal and informal networking opportunities to 
share ideas across units (Kuratko and Audretsch, 2009). 
 21 
 
 Articulate connection between individual job functions and 
firm-level strategies. 
 Recognize and reward employees for innovative process 
improvements. 
 Align employee performance incentives with desired 
organizational outcomes. 
 Formalize employee goal-setting and performance 
evaluations. 
Internal Capabilities  Develop workforce skills through formal training and 
mentoring programs. 
 Revamp human resource practices to facilitate continuous 
growth and development for employees (Covin and Miles, 
1999; Dess et al., 2003). 
 Formalize cross-training opportunities to teach new skill-
sets to employees. 
 Implement new information technology systems (Covin 
and Miles, 1999). 
 Improve inventory and distribution systems (Dess et al., 
2003). 
 Seek employee input on how to execute existing firm 
strategies. 
  
 
Director Human Capital, Social Capital, and Corporate Entrepreneurship 
 Research to date has generally ignored the role that the board of directors plays 
in promoting corporate entrepreneurship efforts within the organization (Corbett et al., 
2013; Phan et al., 2009).  Prior research has investigated the role of multiple levels 
within the corporation – including individuals, middle managers, top management teams, 
and chief executive officers – in fostering an entrepreneurial approach, but it has lacked 
a specific focus on how directors help to set the tone for corporate entrepreneurship.  
This is a surprising literature gap given how central directors are in the strategic 
planning and decision-making processes of the firm, and according to Forbes and 
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Milliken (1999, p. 502), “understanding the nature of effective board functioning is 
among the most important areas of management research on the horizon”. 
 Why do directors matter for corporate entrepreneurship?  In short, directors serve 
as valuable resources to organizations that are focused on implementing corporate 
entrepreneurship practices, bringing to bear their previous industry expertise, 
entrepreneurial experience, and personal relationships, among many other human and 
social capital resources.  I define director human capital as “the skills and experiences 
that individual directors bring to the decision-making process” (Johnson et al., 2013, p. 
240) and director social capital as the ties to external organizations and network 
connections that individual directors bring to the decision-making process (Johnson, 
Schnatterly, Bolton, and Tuggle, 2011).  This human capital and social capital of 
directors can be leveraged by the corporation to identify new opportunities, enhance firm 
performance, and develop competitive advantages over time (Ireland et al., 2003).  The 
board of directors sets the stage for how the organization will be led and provides the 
framework for the decision-making process.  This group of decision makers, though 
small in size, has a large impact on setting the short- and long-term strategies for 
continued growth.  More specifically, directors guide and encourage the senior 
management team to enable corporate entrepreneurship through sustained regeneration, 
organizational rejuvenation, strategic renewal, domain redefinition, and business model 
reconstruction.  To return to the earlier example, Microsoft’s investor relations website 
states that “good corporate governance encourages accountability and transparency, and 
promotes good decision-making to support our business over decades” 
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(microsoft.com/investor, 2015).  The organization’s corporate governance guidelines 
underscore the critical role that board members serve in establishing organizational 
objectives, overseeing business affairs and integrity, and working with management to 
determine the firm’s mission and long-term strategy (Microsoft Corporate Governance 
Guidelines, 2015). 
 In essence, these directors are valuable resources for the firm, and resource 
dependence theory provides an appropriate lens for evaluating the relationship between 
corporate governance and corporate entrepreneurship (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003).  
“Resource dependence theory asserts that as a firm’s external environment changes, so 
does the need for linkages with that environment.  Therefore, the composition of the 
board may be strategically altered in order to provide the benefits of reduced uncertainty 
for firms in a different environment and to facilitate strategic change” (Hillman et al., 
2000, p. 242).  Microsoft’s drastic overhaul of its board of directors in 2014 is a practical 
illustration of the important role that directors – as resources for the firm – play in 
facilitating change and corporate entrepreneurship efforts within the organization.  The 
following section introduces the resource dependence theoretical framework. 
 
Resource Dependence Theory 
 “Boards of directors serve two important functions for organizations: monitoring 
management on behalf of shareholders and providing resources” (Hillman and Dalziel, 
2003, p. 383).  Prior literature has investigated these board functions through two 
separate theoretical frameworks:  agency theory and resource dependence theory.  
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Agency theory considers the conflicts of interest that arise in organizations due to the 
separation of ownership and control (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976).  Thus, a primary role of directors is to monitor the actions and decisions of 
managers to protect the interests of shareholders.  Resource dependence theory, on the 
other hand, focuses on the board of directors as a provider of resources for the firm 
(Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), primarily by leveraging the 
directors’ human and social capital to influence firm strategy, decisions, and 
performance. 
 Even though agency theory has been the predominant theoretical framework for 
corporate governance to date, resource dependence theory provides an equally important 
perspective of the primary functions of corporate boards.  In fact, empirical evidence 
actually suggests that resource dependence theory is a more successful lens for 
understanding boards than agency theory (Hillman et al., 2009).  “In future research 
scholars may yield more productive results by focusing on the assistance directors 
provide in bringing valued resources to the firm and in serving as a source of advice and 
counsel for CEOs” (Daily et al., 2003, p. 375) instead of focusing on directors’ 
monitoring and control function.  In particular, additional studies are needed to 
disentangle the types of human and social capital on boards that matter for 
organizational performance and competitive advantage (Hillman et al., 2009).  Table 4 
provides some examples of how corporate governance definitions have evolved over 
time, more recently placing a stronger focus on resource dependence theory.  Based on 
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these calls for further research, this study implements a resource dependence theoretical 
framework to investigate the influence of board capital on corporate entrepreneurship. 
 
Table 4. Prior definitions of corporate governance 
Donaldson, 1990 “Corporate governance is the structure whereby managers at 
the organizational apex are controlled through the board of 
directors, its associated structures, executive incentive, and 
other schemes of monitoring and bonding” (p. 376). 
 
Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997 
“Our perspective on corporate governance is a straightforward 
agency perspective, sometimes referred to as separation of 
ownership and control. We want to know how investors get the 
managers to give them back their money” (p. 738). 
 
La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, 
and Vishny, 2000 
“Corporate governance is, to a large extent, a set of 
mechanisms through which outside investors protect 
themselves against expropriation by the insiders” (p. 4). 
 
Daily, Dalton, and 
Cannella, 2003 
“We define governance as the determination of the broad uses 
to which organizational resources will be deployed and the 
resolution of conflicts among the myriad participants in 
organizations. This definition stands in some contrast to the 
many decades of governance research, in which researchers 
have focused primarily on the control of executive self-interest 
and the protection of shareholder interests in settings where 
organizational ownership and control are separated.” (p. 371). 
 
Aguilera and 
Jackson, 2010 
“Corporate governance may be defined broadly as the study of 
power and influence over decision making within the 
corporation” (p. 487). 
 
Tihanyi, Graffin, 
and George, 2014 
“Corporate governance is the system by which companies are 
directed and controlled… [the] leadership systems, managerial 
control protocols, property rights, decision rights, and other 
practices that give organizations their authority and mandates 
for action” (p. 1535). 
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 Resource dependence theory posits that the board of directors helps to reduce 
uncertainty by connecting the organization with its external environment (Hillman et al., 
2000; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  The board serves as the link between the 
organization and the critical resources needed to enhance performance (Nicholson and 
Kiel, 2007; Pfeffer, 1973).  This provision of resources function aids the firm in several 
ways, such as strengthening legitimacy, providing expertise, offering advice and 
counsel, connecting the firm to outside stakeholders and relationships, and helping with 
firm strategy and decision-making (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003).  Directors’ ability to 
bring these resources to bear stems from their human and social capital (Hillman, 
Nicholson, and Shropshire, 2008).  “The primary antecedent of the board’s provision of 
resources examined in previous literature is board capital… [which includes] directors’ 
expertise, experience, knowledge, reputation, and skills” (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003, p. 
386) as well as directors’ social ties to external organizations and networks of 
relationships (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003).  As a result, prior scholars have modeled 
resource dependence theory in the following temporal path:  board capital, provision of 
resources for the firm, and firm performance. 
 A strong link between resource dependence theory and strategic entrepreneurship 
has already been established in the literature.  Ireland et al. (2003) discussed three 
critical resources for engaging in strategic entrepreneurship:  financial capital, human 
capital, and social capital.  Financial capital is a tangible asset whereas human and social 
capital are intangible assets.  Dess et al. (2003) noted the prevalence of previous research 
on tangible assets and the importance of future research efforts on intangible assets like 
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human and social capital.  This study investigates the role of director human capital and 
social capital, drawing upon an excellent review of the board composition literature by 
Johnson et al. (2013).  “Human capital characteristics are the skills and experiences that 
individual directors bring to the decision-making process… Such experiences affect 
what directors pay attention to and how they frame decisions” (Johnson et al., 2013, p. 
240).  The most commonly used human capital variables in the literature to date are 
industry experience, CEO experience, venture capital experience, financial expertise, 
human capital heterogeneity, and organizational tenure (Johnson et al., 2013).  In 
addition to human capital, “directors’ social relationships affect how both individual 
directors and the board as a whole function. Broadly, social capital can be divided into 
three types: directors’ ties to other firms, personal relationships with firm managers, or 
social standing” (Johnson et al., 2013, p. 243).  The most commonly used social capital 
variables in the literature to date are director interlocks, board seats held, external 
directorships, affiliated directors with business ties, appointed directors, degrees from 
elite educational institutions, and other social standing variables such as status, prestige, 
stigma, and reputation (Johnson et al., 2013).  The following sections build on previous 
literature and argue for the relationships between director capital, entrepreneurial 
orientation, and organizational rejuvenation.  Figure 1 presents the model of studied 
relationships. 
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The Relationship between Director Capital and Organizational Rejuvenation 
Director Human Capital 
 As noted before, director human capital stems from “the skills and experiences 
that individual directors bring to the decision-making process” (Johnson et al., 2013, p. 
240).  Prior research has linked director human capital with the provision of resources 
and subsequent firm performance (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003).  Director human capital 
also predicts the strategies, structures, and policies recommended and supported by the 
board (Dalziel, Gentry, and Bowerman, 2011).  This suggests that directors’ knowledge, 
skills, and experience can directly or indirectly affect firm-level decisions regarding 
internal innovative changes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Model of studied relationships 
 
 In this study, I focus on whether a director is or has been a CEO.  Directors with 
CEO experience rely on this role-specific expertise and knowledge to influence the focal 
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firm’s decision-making process (Stevenson and Radin, 2009).  These directors 
understand all of the factors that must be considered when altering internal business 
structures and processes to enhance competitive standing.  For instance, directors who 
have served as CEOs likely have realigned their organizations’ divisions or departments 
to become more flexible or have created cross-functional teams to identify 
organizational process improvements.  In addition, CEOs have the unique opportunity to 
consider recommendations from several stakeholders before having to make the final 
decision on how to move forward.  This final decision authority prepares CEOs to make 
meaningful contributions as directors on other boards.  Johnson et al. (2013) argue that 
directors’ experiences and skills affect their cognitions and decisions.  Directors with 
CEO experience have a broader view of the total organization than those without that 
experience.  Thus, they may be better equipped to see the value in altering internal 
structures and processes to create a more entrepreneurial firm. 
 Organizational rejuvenation focuses on altering three internal aspects of the firm:  
its structure, processes, and capabilities (Covin and Miles, 1999).  For this study, I focus 
on the structural aspect.  Directors participate in firm decision-making at a strategic level 
and rarely get involved with the small or tactical decisions made throughout the 
organization.  Thus, directors likely will have stronger influence on decisions regarding 
the firm’s internal structure than its processes or capabilities because the structure of the 
firm has a more strategic impact for the entire organization.  In particular, directors who 
have served as CEOs likely have experience with realigning the structure of their firms 
to improve competitive standing.  This previous experience contributes to the decision-
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making process at the focal firm and influences how the corporation alters its internal 
structure.  Therefore, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1: Higher levels of director CEO experience (human capital) lead to 
higher levels of organizational rejuvenation within the firm. 
 
Director Social Capital 
 As noted before, director social capital includes the ties to external organizations 
and network connections that individual directors bring to the decision-making process 
(Johnson et al., 2011).  Prior research has demonstrated that social capital affects the 
advice and counsel offered by directors (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Westphal, 1999) 
and also influences decision-making (Johnson et al., 2013; Oh, Labianca, and Chung, 
2006). In particular, “directors’ social capital is a conduit for the flow of resources, 
information, and advice both into and out of the organization” (Johnson et al., 2013, p. 
245-246).  Directors’ ties to external firms can bring new ideas to the focal organization 
(Johnson et al., 2013), provide channels of communication (Burt, 1980; Haunschild and 
Beckman, 1998), and access to other important resources (Boeker and Goodstein, 1991; 
Hillman et al., 2008; Mizruchi and Stearns, 1994; Pfeffer, 1972). 
 In this study, I focus on directors with concurrent board memberships at other 
organizations, also known as director interlocks.  Directors who serve on at least two 
boards at the same time “may develop beliefs about appropriate courses of action by 
observing firsthand the decision making of their peers at other firms” (Westphal, Seidel, 
and Stewart, 2001, p. 719).  These ties to external firms can result in decision-making 
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scripts that directors reflexively enact at the focal corporation (Scott, 1995; Westphal et 
al., 2001).  Concurrent board members have more ties to external organizations and 
better access to relevant information than those who are not currently serving on another 
board.  Therefore, they may be better equipped to provide timely information for 
strategic decision-making (Cao, Simsek, and Jansen, 2015; Peng and Luo, 2000). 
 I argue that these additional ties to external organizations allow directors to learn 
how other firms evaluate and implement organizational rejuvenation within their ranks.  
Concurrent board memberships can “serve as conduits for accessing new, valuable, 
strategic information and resources to the firm… [and] innovation often arises from 
incorporating knowledge from outside the firm” (Cao et al., 2015).  This social capital 
also gives directors exposure to new approaches and perspectives to help foster 
innovation at the focal firm (Cao et al., 2015).  Perhaps most importantly, directors tied 
to other corporations gain access to private information and knowledge that competitors 
do not have (Cao et al., 2015; Uzzi and Dunlap, 2005).  This private information about 
other firms’ internal structures and capabilities can be leveraged by the focal firm to 
rejuvenate its internal innovations.  Thus, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2: Higher levels of concurrent board memberships (social capital) 
lead to higher  levels of organizational rejuvenation within the firm. 
 
Extending the first two hypotheses, I expect that director human capital and 
social capital will have different levels of influence on firms’ organizational rejuvenation 
efforts depending on the nature of firms studied.  Based on the sample frame of the S&P 
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500, I expect that directors’ human capital (what they know) will have a stronger 
influence on corporate decision-making than their social capital (who they know).  
Larger and more established firms have more complexity across business units and 
divisions, emphasizing the importance of directors’ previous knowledge, skills, and 
experiences during the decision-making process.  Prior research has found that S&P 500 
boards “generally value human capital in their chairs but view social capital through a 
somewhat more complex lens” (Krause, Semadeni, and Withers, 2016, p. 1990).  On the 
other hand, smaller and younger firms face the liability of newness (Politis, 2005; 
Stinchcombe, 1965) and rely heavily on social networks and connections, emphasizing 
the importance of directors’ ties to external organizations and other directors.  Previous 
research has demonstrated that social capital is valuable for managing organizational 
dependence on external constituencies (Krause et al., 2016; Westphal and Milton, 2000), 
a dependence that is much more likely for smaller and younger firms than for larger and 
more established corporations.  Therefore, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3:  Director human capital has a stronger effect on organizational 
rejuvenation than does director social capital. 
 
The Moderating Role of Entrepreneurial Orientation 
 Entrepreneurial orientation is a firm-level, strategic mindset and perspective 
about entrepreneurship reflected in the firm’s processes and corporate culture (Dess and 
Lumpkin, 2005).  It is “a strategic construct that reflects the extent to which firms are 
innovative, proactive, and risk taking in their behavior and management philosophies; or 
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stated more concisely, are entrepreneurial in their strategic posture” (Anderson, Covin, 
and Slevin, 2009, p. 218).  Several other definitions have been proposed in the literature 
(see Table 5), but I adopt the perspective of entrepreneurial orientation as a strategic 
posture at the corporate strategy level for this dissertation.  Entrepreneurial orientation 
plays a significant role in shaping the firm’s growth and adaptation (Cao et al., 2015; 
Covin and Slevin, 1989) and in stimulating effective corporate entrepreneurship and 
organizational performance (Dess and Lumpkin, 2005).  However, prior research has 
suggested that the relationship between entrepreneurial orientation and firm performance 
depends on other factors like the environment, structure, and strategy (Dess and 
Lumpkin, 2005; Dess, Lumpkin, and Covin, 1997).  Further, the organizational context 
is a contributing factor to the firm’s entrepreneurial orientation posture (Cao et al., 2015; 
Covin, Green, and Slevin, 2006). 
 
Table 5. Prior definitions of entrepreneurial orientation 
Miller, 1983 “An entrepreneurial firm is one that engages in product-
market innovation, undertakes somewhat risky ventures, and 
is first to come up with ‘proactive’ innovations, beating 
competitors to the punch… We can tentatively view 
entrepreneurship as a composite weighting of these three 
variables” (p. 771). 
 
Covin and Slevin, 
1991 
“Entrepreneurship is described as a dimension of strategic 
posture represented by a firm’s risk-taking propensity, 
tendency to act in competitively aggressive, proactive 
manners, and reliance on frequent and extensive product 
innovation” (p. 7). 
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Lumpkin and Dess, 
1996 
“An EO refers to the processes, practices, and decision-
making activities that lead to new entry… Thus, it involves 
the intentions and actions of key players functioning in a 
dynamic generative process aimed at new-venture creation. 
The key dimensions that characterize an EO include a 
propensity to act autonomously, a willingness to innovate and 
take risks, and a tendency to be aggressive toward competitors 
and proactive relative to marketplace opportunities. All of 
these factors – autonomy, innovativeness, risk taking, 
proactiveness, and competitive aggressiveness – may be 
present when a firm engages in new entry” (p. 136-137). 
 
Zahra and Neubaum, 
1998 
 
“EO is defined as the sum total of a firm’s radical innovations, 
proactive strategic action, and risk taking activities that are 
manifested in its support of projects with uncertain outcomes 
(Lumpkin & Dess, 1996; Miller, 1983; Wiklund, 1998; Zahra, 
1991, 1996a)… EO, consequently, captures a firm’s 
commitment to innovation, proactiveness and risk taking 
(Wiklund, 1998)” (p. 125). 
 
Anderson, Covin, 
and Slevin, 2009 
“EO is a strategic construct that reflects the extent to which 
firms are innovative, proactive, and risk taking in their 
behavior and management philosophies; or stated more 
concisely, are entrepreneurial in their strategic posture (Covin 
and Slevin, 1989)” (p. 218). 
 
Anderson, Kreiser, 
Kuratko, Hornsby, 
and Eshima, 2015 
“We define EO as a second-order, firm-level construct 
comprised of two lower-order dimensions: entrepreneurial 
behaviors (encompassing innovativeness and proactiveness), 
and managerial attitude towards risk (risk taking). We define 
entrepreneurial behaviors as the firm-level pursuit of new 
products, processes, or business models (e.g., innovativeness) 
with the intended commercialization of those innovations in 
new product/market domains (e.g., proactiveness). We define 
managerial attitude towards risk as an inherent managerial 
inclination—existing at the level of the senior manager(s) 
tasked with developing and implementing firm-level 
strategy—favoring strategic actions that have uncertain 
outcomes (Miller, 1983)” (p. 1582-1583). 
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The value of director human capital for a corporation could vary depending on 
the organizational context (Cao et al., 2015).  Thus, I suggest that the firm’s 
entrepreneurial orientation serves as a contingency variable for the relationship between 
director human capital and organizational rejuvenation.  Hypothesis 1 argued that higher 
levels of director CEO experience lead to higher levels of organizational rejuvenation 
within the firm because those CEO directors likely have experience with realigning the 
structure of their firms to improve competitive standing and, as a result, can better 
influence the focal firm’s decision-making process.  I expect that in firms with a stronger 
entrepreneurial orientation, the benefits of director CEO experience for the firm’s 
organizational rejuvenation will be even stronger.  Firms committed to a corporate-level 
strategy of entrepreneurial orientation likely are more adept at seeking and implementing 
director feedback because they understand the importance of continuous innovation.  
These firms value the skills and experience that CEO directors have gained elsewhere 
and actively include the directors in the decision-making process, enhancing the positive 
effect of director human capital on the firm’s organizational rejuvenation.  On the other 
hand, firms with a weaker entrepreneurial orientation may not take full advantage of the 
resources offered by their directors.  Thus, I hypothesize: 
 Hypothesis 4: The firm’s entrepreneurial orientation positively moderates the 
 relationship between director human capital and organizational rejuvenation. 
 
Further, Hypothesis 2 argued that higher levels of concurrent board memberships 
lead to higher levels of organizational rejuvenation within the firm because directors 
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with more ties to external organizations and more frequent access to relevant 
information are better equipped to provide timely information for strategic decision-
making.  I expect that in firms with a stronger entrepreneurial orientation, the benefits of 
concurrent board memberships for the firm’s organizational rejuvenation will be even 
stronger.  Corporations that value an entrepreneurial orientation strategic posture should 
be more alert to the value of directors’ knowledge and information obtained from other 
firms.  Thus, firm leaders should be more willing to include directors in the decision-
making process, enhancing the positive effect of director social capital on the firm’s 
organizational rejuvenation.  Therefore, I hypothesize: 
 Hypothesis 5: The firm’s entrepreneurial orientation positively moderates the 
 relationship between director social capital and organizational rejuvenation. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHOD 
 
Introduction 
 This chapter discusses the research method undertaken to investigate the 
relationship between director capital, entrepreneurial orientation, and organizational 
rejuvenation.  It begins by explaining the sample of S&P 500 firms and the data 
collection process.  The next section highlights the development of a new measure for 
the dependent variable, organizational rejuvenation.  A discussion of the predictor 
variables follows, providing the rationale for the measures of director human capital, 
director social capital, and firm entrepreneurial orientation. 
 
Data Collection and Sample 
 To test the hypotheses, I collected publicly available data on established 
corporations for a span of multiple years.  Prior research has suggested that there is quite 
a gap of studies – particularly in the corporate entrepreneurship literature – that employ a 
longitudinal design; thus, there is a need to address this shortcoming in future studies 
(Zahra et al., 2013).  Including longitudinal data in this study allowed me to test the key 
research questions over time by evaluating the temporal stability of the relationships of 
interest.  I used the Standard & Poor’s 500 stock market index as the sample for this 
study.  “The S&P 500 is widely regarded as the best single gauge of large-cap U.S. 
equities… and includes 500 leading companies and captures approximately 80% 
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coverage of available market capitalization” (S&P Dow Jones Indices, LLC).  This index 
provides an ideal sample to test the hypotheses because the firms are well-established 
corporations with similar corporate governance mandates and board practices. 
 Common trade-offs to consider when selecting a sample include one versus 
multiple countries and even one versus multiple industries.  For this study, I have chosen 
a U.S. sample based on the breadth and depth of data availability and multiple industries 
to enhance the potential generalizability of the findings.  Even though choosing a single 
industry can help to narrow the focus and provide more specific recommendations, I 
believe – for this study – that there is more value in testing these relationships across 
industries and over a longer period of time.  However, I acknowledge that this 
intentional focus on S&P 500 firms introduces a sample selection bias because the final 
sample does not fully represent the entire population of public U.S. firms.  This is a 
limitation of the study that could adversely affect causal inference.  The sample is spread 
across 24 industry groups and 63 industries according to the Global Industry 
Classification Standard (GICS).  See Table 6 for a listing of the 24 industry groups. 
Given the fluid nature of directors joining and leaving boards at any given time 
as well as the potential lag in their ability to influence organizational rejuvenation, it is 
important to consider these key variables for more than just one year.  Therefore, I chose 
a sample frame of S&P 500 companies from 2010 to 2014, resulting in an unbalanced 
panel dataset with five years of data on the variables of interest. 
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Table 6. Global Industry Classification Standard industry groups and codes 
 
Code Industry Group Code Industry Group 
1010 Energy 3030 Household & Personal Products 
1510 Materials 3510 Health Care Equipment & 
Services 
2010 Capital Goods 3520 Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology, 
& Life Sciences 
2020 Commercial & Professional 
Services 
4010 Banks 
2030 Transportation 4020 Diversified Financials 
2510 Automobiles & Components 4030 Insurance 
2520 Consumer Durables & Apparel 4040 Real Estate 
2530 Consumer Services 4510 Software & Services 
2540 Media 4520 Technology Hardware & 
Equipment 
2550 Retailing 4530 Semiconductors & Semiconductor 
Equipment 
3010 Consumer Staples 5010 Telecommunication Services 
3020 Food, Beverage, & Tobacco 5510 Utilities 
 
 The initial sample frame contained 2,495 firm-year observations from 570 firms.  
During this period, 40 firms were acquired by or merged with other companies (or went 
private in the case of Dell Inc.), reducing the sample size to 2,455 firm-year 
observations.  A closer examination of these mergers and acquisitions revealed the 
following merger/acquisition completion dates:  12 transactions in 2010, eight in 2011, 
nine in 2012, six in 2013, and five in 2014.  In addition, the 40 firms represented 29 
different industries (four-digit SIC), and the largest overlap of any particular industry 
was just three firms.  Therefore, it appears that the missing completely at random 
assumption can be made, in which there is nothing systematic happening that makes 
some data more likely to be missing than others.  In addition, firms that were added to 
the S&P 500 list (or went public) after 2010 did not have data from a previous year to 
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calculate the dependent variable, further reducing the sample size to 2,361.  Finally, 
accounting for missing data on the cash control variable and one duplicate value 
resulting from the Merck-Schering merger, the final sample contained 2,289 firm-year 
observations from 524 companies.  Table 7 shows the summary statistics and correlation 
matrix for the final sample.  Given the panel design, the correlation matrix pools the firm 
and year effects and displays pairwise correlations between the variables. 
 
Dependent Variable – Organizational Rejuvenation 
 A primary contribution of this dissertation is the development of a new archival 
measure of organizational rejuvenation, one of the five constructs in the strategic 
entrepreneurship domain of corporate entrepreneurship (Morris et al., 2010).  As a brief 
recap, organizational rejuvenation focuses on altering internal structures, processes, and 
capabilities in the organization to maintain or improve competitive standing (Covin and 
Miles, 1999).  In this case, the target of corporate entrepreneurship is the organization 
itself.  The development of this new measure of organizational rejuvenation contributes 
in two primary ways.  First, prior research has tended to focus on subjective, survey-
based measures of corporate entrepreneurship, often neglecting the potential value of 
archival data.  Although subjective measures obtained by surveying corporate managers 
are relevant and impactful, this study adds to previous methods by measuring corporate 
entrepreneurship with objective, secondary data.  
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Table 7. Summary statistics and correlation matrix 
 
 
 Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
8 
 
9 10 11 
1. Org. Rejuvenation 0.03 0.06            
2. Board Tenure 8.76 3.32 -0.04           
3. Log Cash 6.75 1.52 -0.04 -0.14          
4. CEO Experience 0.60 0.16 -0.04 -0.22 0.19         
5. MeanCEO 0.60 0.15 -0.04 -0.23 0.20 0.95        
6. DevCEO 0.00 0.05 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.33 0.00       
7. Concurrent Seats 1.72 0.68 0.01 -0.22 0.16 0.29 0.30 0.04      
8. MeanConcurrent 1.72 0.64 0.01 -0.24 0.18 0.30 0.32 -0.00 0.93     
9. DevConcurrent 0.00 0.25 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.03 -0.00 0.11 0.36 -0.00    
10. Entre. Orientation 0.25 0.11 -0.00 -0.08 0.22 0.05 0.06 -0.01 0.03 0.03 -0.02   
11. MeanEO 0.25 0.10 0.00 -0.09 0.23 0.05 0.06 -0.00 0.03 0.04 -0.00 0.96  
12. DevEO 0.00 0.03 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.07 0.27 0.00 
   N =  2,289.  Correlations significant at the p < .05 level are in bold.
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Second, the five constructs of strategic entrepreneurship – sustained regeneration, 
organizational rejuvenation, strategic renewal, domain redefinition, and business model 
reconstruction – have received much attention in theoretical models in prior studies, but 
researchers have struggled to empirically test these constructs given the lack of specific 
measures for these variables.  This study adds to existing literature by suggesting a 
straightforward way to empirically measure and test one of these strategic 
entrepreneurship constructs. 
 The new measure of organizational rejuvenation used in this study reflects a 
modified Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which shows the distribution of a variable 
by measuring the degree of concentration across units (Owen, Ryan, and Weatherston, 
2007).  The HHI is commonly used as a statistical measure of market concentration, 
which is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in a particular 
market and then summing those results.  The resulting HHI has a range of near zero to 
1.0.  In the case of market share, lower HHI values signify lower concentration (strong 
competition in the market), and higher HHI values signify higher concentration (weak 
competition in the market).  The HHI also is a useful measure for within-firm 
concentrations (Acar and Sankaran, 1999), as it is used in this dissertation. 
 This study introduces a business segment HHI as the first step for the dependent 
variable, organizational rejuvenation.  Each firm in the S&P 500 reports business 
segment revenue as part of the required annual statements.  For instance, Microsoft 
reported five business segments in its fiscal year 2014 annual report:  devices and 
consumer licensing, devices and consumer hardware, devices and consumer other, 
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commercial licensing, and commercial other.  The business segment HHI is calculated 
by squaring each business segment revenue percentage and then summing those results.  
The resulting measure for any particular year has a range of near zero to 1.0.  Lower 
values signify less concentrated business segments; higher values signify more 
concentrated business segments.  In other words, values approaching 1.0 for any 
particular year represent firms that rely heavily on just one business segment.  In the 
case of Microsoft, the 2014 business segment HHI was 0.31. 
The final measure of organizational rejuvenation represents the absolute value of 
change in business segment HHI year-over-year.  Business segments represent the 
internal structure of the firm, the focus of organizational rejuvenation.  Corporate leaders 
evaluate the status of their firms and decide how to implement internal innovations to 
company structure.  This could include the reallocation of resources from one business 
segment to another to make the firm more flexible or efficient.  It may also involve the 
creation or elimination of business segments altogether to improve the firm’s 
entrepreneurial position and competitive standing.  Thus, the year-over-year change in 
business segment HHI – the internal structure of the firm – serves as a good measure for 
organizational rejuvenation. 
This proposed new measure for corporate entrepreneurship merits a further 
discussion regarding construct validity, or the degree to which the operationalization 
adequately captures the conceptual domain of the theoretical construct.  Table 8 provides 
the original language used to develop the organizational rejuvenation construct in three 
noteworthy corporate entrepreneurship articles:  Covin and Miles (1999), Dess et al. 
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(2003), as well as Kuratko and Audretsch (2009).  These scholars suggested that 
organizational rejuvenation alters internal structures, processes, or capabilities; renews 
core attributes of the firm’s internal operations; incorporates process, administrative, and 
structural innovations inside the firm; facilitates the transfer of core competencies and 
communication across divisions; reengineers major business processes; and even 
introduces a fundamental redesign of the entire organization.  This conceptual domain 
matches well with Statement No. 131 from the Financial Accounting Standards Board, 
which defines a business segment as a firm component that is regularly evaluated by 
organizational decision makers to determine how to allocate resources and to assess firm 
performance (see Table 8).  In other words, senior management members have the 
discretion to choose the business segments that make sense for their firm decision-
making process, and they decide how to best allocate the limited resources and make 
judgement calls across the firm’s internal structure and operations. 
This study’s operationalization of organizational rejuvenation accounts for both 
sides of the theoretical construct:  not only how the firm is internally structured but also 
how these internal operations and attributes are redesigned and rejuvenated by firm 
decision-makers.  The business segment HHI provides a yearly snapshot of the internal 
structure degree of concentration – to what extent the firm relies on multiple business 
segments – and the year-over-year change provides the bigger picture of how firms are 
implementing organizational rejuvenation – to what extent the firm is altering its internal 
structures, processes, capabilities, and core operational attributes.  As suggested by 
Kuratko and Audretsch (2009), organizational rejuvenation can result from a single 
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internal innovation that has widespread implications for the firm or from multiple 
smaller innovations that collectively enhance organizational efficiency or effectiveness.  
Microsoft’s discussion of business segments in its 2013 and 2014 annual reports 
provides a recent example of the former (see Table 8).  The corporation overhauled its 
organizational structure and business segments in 2014 during its transformation to a 
devices and services company.  As a result, all five business segments that drove 
decision-making in 2013 were replaced with five brand new segments in 2014. 
I acknowledge that business segment revenues can be affected by many factors 
other than intentional corporate entrepreneurship decisions, but the firm’s deliberate 
reporting of its major business segments provides a good measure of internal structure.  
This variable was hand-collected from 10-K statements in the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission EDGAR database.  Table 9 provides an example of this measure 
for Microsoft, Apple, and Google in fiscal year 2014. 
 
Table 8. Conceptual domain of the organizational rejuvenation construct 
 
Covin and Miles, 
1999, p. 52 
 “The organization seeks to sustain or improve its 
competitive standing by altering its internal processes, 
structures, and/or capabilities 
 The focus of innovation is the organization per se 
 Efforts to sustain or increase competitiveness through the 
improved execution of particular, pre-existing business 
strategies” 
Dess et al., 2003, 
p. 355 
 “Improving the firm’s ability to execute strategies 
 Often entails changes to value chain activities 
 Process and administrative innovations 
 Become more entrepreneurial through processes and 
structures 
 Radical administrative routines and operating policies 
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 Renew one or more major aspects of the firm’s 
operations” 
Kuratko and 
Audretsch, 2009, 
p. 9 
 “Core attributes associated with the firm’s internal 
operations 
 Create a superior organizational vehicle through which the 
firm’s strategy can be implemented 
 Achieve competitive advantage without changing strategy, 
product offerings, or served markets 
 Fundamental redesign of the entire organization 
 Major business process reengineering projects 
 Single innovations that have sweeping implications for the 
firm 
 Multiple smaller innovations that collectively contribute 
to significantly increased organizational efficiency or 
effectiveness at strategy implementation 
 Administrative innovations designed to facilitate inter-unit 
communications or the transference of core competencies” 
Financial Accounting 
Standards Board, 
Statement No. 131 
(SEC requirement) 
 “Operating segments are components of an enterprise 
about which separate financial information is available 
that is evaluated regularly by the chief operating decision 
maker in deciding how to allocate resources and in 
assessing performance. Generally, financial information is 
required to be reported on the basis that it is used 
internally for evaluating segment performance and 
deciding how to allocate resources to segments.” 
Microsoft Annual 
Report, 2013 
 “Our segments provide management with a 
comprehensive financial view of our key businesses. The 
segments enable the alignment of strategies and objectives 
across the development, sales, marketing, and services 
organizations, and they provide a framework for timely 
and rational allocation of development, sales, marketing, 
and services resources within businesses. 
 During the periods presented, we operated our business in 
five segments: Windows Division, Server and Tools, 
Online Services Division, Microsoft Business Division, 
and Entertainment and Devices Division. In July 2013, we 
announced a change in organizational structure as part of 
our transformation to a devices and services company. As 
we evolve how we allocate resources and analyze 
performance in the new structure, it is possible that our 
segments may change.” 
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Microsoft Annual 
Report, 2014 
 “During the first quarter of fiscal year 2014, we changed 
our organizational structure as part of our transformation 
to a devices and services company. As a result, 
information that our chief operating decision maker 
regularly reviews for purposes of allocating resources and 
assessing performance changed. Therefore, beginning in 
fiscal year 2014, we reported our financial performance 
based on our new segments: Devices and Consumer 
Licensing, D&C Hardware, D&C Other, Commercial 
Licensing, and Commercial Other.” 
 
 
Table 9. Organizational rejuvenation measure for fiscal year 2014 
 
 
Company-Defined Segments 
2013 
Revenue 
 
Squared 
2014 
Revenue 
 
Squared 
 
Microsoft 
    
Windows division 24.2% 0.0585   
Server and tools 26.3% 0.0691   
Online services division 4.3% 0.0018   
Microsoft business division 32.0% 0.1027   
Entertainment and devices 13.2% 0.0175   
Devices and consumer licensing   21.6% 0.0464 
Devices and consumer hardware   13.3% 0.0177 
Devices and consumer other   8.3% 0.0069 
Commercial licensing   48.2% 0.2320 
Commercial other   8.7% 0.0075 
Total 100% 0.2496 100% 0.3106 
Year-over-year change    0.0610 
     
Apple     
Americas 36.7% 0.1348 35.7% 0.1273 
Europe 22.2% 0.0491 22.4% 0.0501 
Greater China 14.9% 0.0221 16.3% 0.0267 
Japan 7.9% 0.0062 8.2% 0.0067 
Rest of Asia Pacific 6.5% 0.0043 5.7% 0.0032 
Retail 11.8% 0.0140 11.7% 0.0138 
Total 100% 0.2305 100% 0.2278 
Year-over-year change    0.0027 
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Company-Defined Segments 
2013 
Revenue 
 
Squared 
2014 
Revenue 
 
Squared 
 
Google 
    
United States 44.6% 0.1988 42.6% 0.1818 
United Kingdom 10.1% 0.0102 9.8% 0.0096 
Rest of world 45.3% 0.2055 47.6% 0.2260 
Total 100% 0.4144 100% 0.4175 
Year-over-year change    0.0031 
     
 
Predictor Variables 
Director Human Capital 
 Director CEO experience.  A useful conceptualization of human capital is the 
experience and skills that directors bring to the board (Stevenson and Radin, 2009).  
Director human capital has previously been measured by industry experience, 
entrepreneurial experience, CEO experience, venture capital experience, financial 
expertise, experience with specific activities (e.g., prior experience with approving 
acquisitions, deciding on international issues, firing the CEO), director experience 
diversity, and organizational tenure, among many others (Johnson et al., 2013).  For this 
study, director human capital is operationalized as director CEO experience.  Directors 
who have served as CEOs have the relevant experience, knowledge, and influence to 
make strong contributions to the board of directors.  In particular, prior or current CEO 
directors should have previous experience with improving their firms’ ability to execute 
business strategies, encouraging process and administrative innovations, changing core 
attributes of internal operations, and even fundamentally redesigning the organizational 
structures of their firms.  They also likely have strong decision-making capabilities and 
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resource allocation experience that can benefit decisions made by the focal firm.  In line 
with prior calls to improve the consistency and measurement of board characteristics 
(Johnson et al., 2013), in this study director CEO experience is a firm-level ratio 
measure that captures the number of directors who have served as CEO divided by total 
board size.  This variable was hand-collected from proxy statements in the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission EDGAR database. 
 
Director Social Capital 
 Concurrent board memberships.  A useful conceptualization of social capital is 
the investment in social relations through ties that board members have to others 
(Stevenson and Radin, 2009).  Director social capital has previously been measured by 
director ties to other firms (e.g., single ties, double ties, interlocks), personal 
relationships and affiliations (e.g., affiliated directors with business ties, directors 
appointed by the CEO, personal/family ties to the CEO), and social standing (e.g., status, 
prestige, stigma, reputation), among many others (Johnson et al., 2013).  For this study, 
director social capital is operationalized as concurrent board memberships at public, 
private, and nonprofit organizations.  Directors who serve on multiple boards have 
increased network connections as well as better access and exposure to information (Kor 
and Sundaramurthy, 2009).  In line with prior calls to improve the consistency and 
measurement of board characteristics (Johnson et al., 2013), this study adopts the 
measure of average concurrent board memberships (Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2009) 
which is the total number of other board seats concurrently held by the focal firm’s 
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directors divided by total board size.  This variable was hand-collected from proxy 
statements in the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission EDGAR database. 
 
Entrepreneurial Orientation 
 Entrepreneurial orientation is defined as “a strategic construct that reflects the 
extent to which firms are innovative, proactive, and risk taking in their behavior and 
management philosophies; or stated more concisely, are entrepreneurial in their strategic 
posture” (Anderson et al., 2009, p. 218).  Miller (2011) noted the tendency for 
researchers to use the same measures of entrepreneurial orientation over and over based 
on instruments that were originally created decades ago, and he suggested that future 
research should incorporate new approaches and measurements.  In addition, very few 
entrepreneurial orientation studies have included longitudinal or panel data in their 
research methods, thus ignoring the temporal stability of the relationships between 
entrepreneurial orientation and its drivers and outcomes (Miller, 2011). 
 The use of objective entrepreneurial orientation measures from secondary data 
presents a viable alternative to the subjective, survey-based measures that have 
proliferated in the literature to date.  Measuring entrepreneurial orientation with 
secondary data, particularly via computer-aided text analysis, could help to reduce 
researcher inference and interpretation of interview responses, allow for replication and 
comparison across studies, and reduce issues with managerial biases and nonrespondent 
bias associated with survey data (Lyon, Lumpkin, and Dess, 2000).  In addition, content 
analysis allows for the measurement of phenomena directly at the organizational level 
 51 
 
(instead of collecting and aggregating many employee surveys for every organization), 
facilitates longitudinal analysis due to the commonly available organizational narratives 
in annual reports and corporate websites, and lowers the likelihood of biases from recall 
or demand characteristics (McKenny, Short, and Payne, 2013).  However, there are 
important trade-offs when using secondary data, including measurement error and 
construct validity concerns.  Data collection could be affected by human error in the 
coding process, inconsistent judgement of variable coding, inconsistent reporting of data 
across firms, and even issues with measures not capturing their intended constructs, 
among others. 
 For this study, entrepreneurial orientation is measured at the firm-level based on 
Short’s dictionary of terms for the innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk taking 
dimensions (Short, Broberg, Cogliser, and Brigham, 2010).  This newer measure of 
entrepreneurial orientation is gaining acceptance as a viable alternative to the more 
commonly used subjective measures (Allison, McKenny, and Short, 2013; Engelen, 
Neumann, and Schmidt, 2013; Engelen, Neumann, and Schwens, 2015; Mousa, Wales, 
and Harper, 2015; Short et al., 2010; Wolfe and Shepherd, 2015; Zachary, McKenny, 
Short, Davis, and Wu, 2011).  Following prior studies, I entered the dictionary terms into 
the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) program to perform a computer-aided 
text analysis of firms’ entrepreneurial orientation.  For each firm-year observation, 
LIWC analyzed the business section of the annual report (Form 10-K, Part I, Item 1) to 
identify the frequency of entrepreneurial orientation terms that were used to describe 
general business operations.  This business section allows corporations to discuss items 
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such as company background, business strategy, business organization and segments, 
products and services, markets and distribution, customers, competition, research and 
development, intellectual property, geographic operations, organizational culture, and 
employees, among other general business operations.  LIWC provides the resulting 
values as a percentage of overall content, which normalizes potential differences based 
on shorter or longer narratives.  This study adopts the measure of entrepreneurial 
orientation as the average value of innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk taking for 
each firm-year observation.  This variable was collected from 10-K statements in the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission EDGAR database. 
 
Control Variables 
 The selection and inclusion of control variables has received increasing attention 
in the literature (Atinc, Simmering, and Kroll, 2012; Spector and Brannick, 2011).  
Scholars suggest that “the automatic or blind inclusion of control variables in multiple 
regression and other analyses…is widespread and can be considered an example of 
practice based on a methodological urban legend” (Spector and Brannick, 2011, p. 287).  
Controls should be carefully considered and should have logical reasons for including 
them in the research model.  As a result, I have limited the inclusion of controls in this 
study to two variables:  board tenure and firm cash.  However, limiting the number of 
controls could create an issue with omitted variables.  Random effects models operate 
under the assumption that the independent variables are not correlated with the firm-
level disturbance or the error term.  Omitted variables that create a correlation between 
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an independent variable and the firm-level disturbance would result in endogeneity 
(Certo, Withers, and Semadeni, 2016).  This is a potential limitation of including a select 
few control variables. 
Board tenure is the average number of years on the focal board for all directors 
in a particular firm-year observation.  When considering the effects of director human 
capital and social capital on organizational rejuvenation, it is probable that board tenure 
has a meaningful influence on decisions made by the firm.  For instance, longer board 
tenure may encourage directors to keep the status quo whereas shorter board tenure may 
motivate directors to consider new ideas and try alternative approaches.  This variable 
was hand-collected from proxy statements in the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission EDGAR database.  In addition, firm size likely has a meaningful effect on 
corporate decision making at the board of directors level.  For example, larger 
corporations with better access to financial resources may be more willing to restructure 
or add to their internal operations than smaller corporations with less financial resources.  
Firm cash is the log transformed cash for each firm-year observation (any immediately 
negotiable medium of exchange including cash and equivalents).  This variable was 
collected from Compustat.  
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CHAPTER 4 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
Introduction 
This chapter begins by highlighting the model specification and discussing the 
hybrid approach used to analyze the data.  The hybrid approach uses random effects 
models to estimate both the within- and between-firm effects of each independent 
variable.  The chapter concludes with the results of the hypotheses tests. 
 
Model Specification 
 The research model for this study uses the following equation: 
OrgRejit = β1MeanCEOi + β2(CEOit - MeanCEOi) + β3MeanConcurrenti + 
β4(Concurrentit – MeanConcurrenti) + β5(MeanCEOi * MeanEOi) + β6[(CEOit - 
MeanCEOi) * (EOit - MeanEOi)] + β7(MeanConcurrenti * MeanEOi) + β8[(Concurrentit - 
MeanConcurrenti) * (EOit - MeanEOi)] + ΛBoardTenureit + ΛlogFirmCashit + ui + eit 
 The equation predicts Organizational Rejuvenation for firm i at time t in a time-
series cross-sectional model in which CEO = Director CEO Experience; Concurrent = 
Concurrent Board Memberships; and EO = Entrepreneurial Orientation.  Board Tenure 
and log Firm Cash are control variables with coefficient estimates Λ.  In addition, u is 
the firm-level disturbance and e is the error term. 
 Rather than limiting the data analysis to only a fixed effects or random effects 
model which would restrict interpretation to only within-firm variation or combined 
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within- and between-firm variation, this study adopts a hybrid approach (Allison, 2005; 
Certo et al., 2016).  Researchers generally have three choices for analyzing panel data:  
random effects models which combine within- and between-firm variation, fixed effects 
models which only use within-firm variation, and a hybrid approach which separates out 
the within-firm and between-firm variation (Certo et al., 2016).  A major advantage of a 
random effects model is keeping both types of variance in the analysis, improving 
overall model efficiency and statistical power.  However, this approach collapses 
together the between- and within-firm variance into the same coefficient, which does not 
allow for a separate investigation of the between- and within-firm relationships.  Another 
disadvantage of a random effects model is the potential correlation between independent 
variables and the group-level disturbance resulting from omitted variables, which 
contaminates the between-group variance and creates endogeneity at the firm level.  
Alternatively, a fixed effects model discards the between-firm information and only uses 
within-firm variation.  Although this eliminates the potential bias resulting from a 
correlation between independent variables and the group-level disturbance, a major 
disadvantage of a fixed effects model is that it is less efficient because it gets rid of the 
between-firm information (Certo et al., 2016). 
“The chief advantage of Allison’s hybrid approach involves the ability to 
compare and contrast within- and between-firm influences of independent variables by 
examining β1 and β2” (Certo et al., 2016).  Following this technique, I split each Level 1 
independent variable (director CEO experience, concurrent board memberships, and 
entrepreneurial orientation) into two variables:  reflected below as “mean” and “dev” 
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variables.  The mean value is the group mean of the independent variable that reflects 
the between-firm effect, whereas the dev value is a group-mean centered variable that 
represents the within-firm effect of the independent variable.  Thus, the hybrid approach 
separates out and reports both the between-firm and within-firm estimates resulting from 
these split variables.  Table 10 provides an example of these mean and dev variables for 
the first corporation in the sample, Abbott Laboratories. 
 
Table 10. Group mean and group-mean centered variables for Abbott Laboratories 
Year Director CEO 
Experience 
MeanCEO DevCEO 
2010 0.6667 0.7661 -0.0994 
2011 0.8000 0.7661 0.0339 
2012 0.7273 0.7661 -0.0388 
2013 0.8182 0.7661 0.0521 
2014 0.8182 0.7661 0.0521 
    
 Concurrent Board 
Memberships 
MeanConcurrent DevConcurrent 
2010 2.5833 2.2712 0.3121 
2011 2.5000 2.2712 0.2288 
2012 2.0000 2.2712 -0.2712 
2013 2.2727 2.2712 0.0015 
2014 2.0000 2.2712 -0.2712 
    
 Entrepreneurial 
Orientation 
MeanEO DevEO 
2010 0.3900 0.3600 0.0300 
2011 0.3733 0.3600 0.0133 
2012 0.3200 0.3600 -0.0400 
2013 0.3700 0.3600 0.0100 
2014 0.3467 0.3600 -0.0133 
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 After splitting the Level 1 independent variables into group mean and group-
mean centered variables, the hybrid approach uses a random effects model to estimate 
the between- and within-firm effects of each predictor variable.  The group-mean 
centered estimates are identical to fixed effects model results (even though a random 
effects model is used), and the model provides additional information on the between-
firm effects (Certo et al., 2016).  Including the group-mean centered variables in the 
equation controls for unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level (Wooldridge, 2010) and 
accounts for omitted firm-level variables that may confound the relationship between the 
independent variables and organizational rejuvenation (Antonakis, Bendahan, Jacquart, 
and Lalive, 2010).  Based on the possibility of omitted variables that may influence the 
results between firms, I have included an industry fixed effect (four-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification code) in the model.  In addition, a year fixed effect controls for 
unobserved variance in organizational rejuvenation as a function of time (Gompers, 
Kovner, Lerner, and Scharfstein, 2008) and controls for contemporaneous correlation 
(Certo and Semadeni, 2006).  I removed extreme outliers that were more than three 
standard deviations above or below the mean of the residuals, used clustered standard 
errors, and estimated all models using Stata 14.2 (StataCorp, 2016). 
 
Results of Hypotheses Tests 
 Table 11 presents the results of the hybrid approach.  Model 1 is a baseline 
model with only control variables.  Model 2 presents the main effects of director CEO 
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experience and concurrent board memberships on organizational rejuvenation.  Model 3 
tests the full research model by including the interaction terms. 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that higher levels of director CEO experience lead to 
higher levels of organizational rejuvenation within the firm.  Although the within-firm 
effect was insignificant (DevCEO  = -0.0042, p = ns), the results show a significant 
between-firm effect (MeanCEO  = -0.0253, p = 0.004).  Contrary to the hypothesis, 
higher levels of director CEO experience on the board have a negative effect on 
organizational rejuvenation across firms.  Thus, firms with a higher percentage of CEO 
directors on their boards have lower levels of organizational rejuvenation than do firms 
with a lower percentage of CEO directors.  As a result, this reverse finding does not 
support Hypothesis 1. 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that higher levels of concurrent board memberships lead 
to higher levels of organizational rejuvenation within the firm.  In this case, both the 
within-firm and between-firm effects were insignificant (DevConcurrent  = -0.0016, p 
= ns; MeanConcurrent  = 0.0017, p = ns).  As a result, I did not find support for 
Hypothesis 2. 
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Table 11.  Results of hybrid approach 
 Organizational Rejuvenation 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  (s.e.)  (s.e.)  (s.e.) 
 [p-value] [p-value] [p-value] 
Focal Board Tenure -0.0006 -0.0007* -0.0007* 
 (0.0003) 
[0.091] 
(0.0003) 
[0.034] 
(0.0003) 
[0.038] 
Log Firm Cash -0.0012 -0.0009 -0.0009 
 (0.0010) 
[0.223] 
(0.0010) 
[0.357] 
(0.0010) 
[0.358] 
MeanCEO  -0.0253** -0.0324 
  (0.0087) 
[0.004] 
(0.0199) 
[0.104] 
DevCEO  -0.0042 -0.0031 
  (0.0134) 
[0.757] 
(0.0134) 
[0.817] 
MeanConcurrent  0.0017 0.0051 
  (0.0019) 
[0.383] 
(0.0048) 
[0.290] 
DevConcurrent  -0.0016 -0.0015 
  (0.0038) 
[0.679] 
(0.0038) 
[0.680] 
MeanEO   -0.0025 
(0.0586) 
[0.966] 
DevEO   0.0463 
(0.0279) 
[0.097] 
MeanCEO × MeanEO   0.0318 
(0.0750) 
[0.672] 
DevCEO × DevEO   0.4682 
(0.4284) 
[0.274] 
MeanConcurrent × MeanEO   -0.0133 
(0.0168) 
[0.429] 
DevConcurrent × DevEO   -0.1823* 
(0.0849) 
[0.032] 
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 Organizational Rejuvenation 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  (s.e.)  (s.e.)  (s.e.) 
 [p-value] [p-value] [p-value] 
Constant 0.0358*** 0.0479*** 0.0476** 
 (0.0085) 
[0.000] 
(0.0099) 
[0.000] 
(0.0181) 
[0.009] 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
R-square    within 
                 between 
                  overall 
0.005 
0.436 
0.170 
0.006 
0.451 
0.175 
0.009 
0.453 
0.178 
N 
Number of firms 
2,242 
522 
2,242 
522 
2,237 
521 
* p < .05;  ** p < .01;  *** p < .001 
Mean variables reflect between-firm effects; dev variables reflect within-firm effects. 
 
 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that director human capital has a stronger effect on 
organizational rejuvenation than does director social capital.  After running Model 2, I 
performed a Wald test with the null hypothesis that the coefficients for MeanCEO and 
MeanConcurrent were simultaneously equal to zero, in addition that the coefficients for 
DevCEO and DevConcurrent were simultaneously equal to zero.  The results rejected 
the null hypothesis for MeanCEO and MeanConcurrent (χ2 = 7.96, p = 0.0048), 
indicating that the coefficients were not equal; however, the results failed to reject the 
null hypothesis for DevCEO and DevConcurrent (χ2 = 0.03, p = ns).  Although the 
within-firm variables were not significantly different, the results of the Wald test show 
that the between-firm variables are statistically different predictors of organizational 
rejuvenation (MeanCEO  = -0.0253, MeanConcurrent  = 0.0017).  Director CEO 
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experience has a statistically larger coefficient than concurrent board memberships, 
which provides support for Hypothesis 3 between firms. 
Hypothesis 4 predicted that the firm’s entrepreneurial orientation positively 
moderates the  relationship between director CEO experience and organizational 
rejuvenation.  In this case, both the within-firm and between-firm effects were 
insignificant (Dev  = 0.4682, p = ns) (Mean  = 0.0318, p = ns).  As a result, I did not 
find support for Hypothesis 4. 
Hypothesis 5 predicted that the firm’s entrepreneurial orientation positively 
moderates the  relationship between concurrent board memberships and organizational 
rejuvenation.  Although the between-firm effect was insignificant (Mean  = -0.0133, p 
= ns), the results show a significant within-firm effect (Dev  = -0.1823, p = 0.032).  
Contrary to the hypothesis, the interaction of concurrent board memberships and 
entrepreneurial orientation has a negative effect on organizational rejuvenation within 
firms.  Figure 2 plots this interaction of DevConcurrent and DevEO on organizational 
rejuvenation using a 95% confidence interval band, demonstrating a decrease in 
organizational rejuvenation as board social capital and entrepreneurial orientation 
increase within the firm.  In addition, Figure 3 plots the average marginal effect of 
DevConcurrent on organizational rejuvenation across a range of DevEO values using a 
95% confidence interval band.  As a result, this reverse finding does not support 
Hypothesis 5. 
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Figure 2. Interaction of DevConcurrent and DevEO on Organizational Rejuvenation 
(95% confidence interval) 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Average marginal effect of DevConcurrent on Organizational Rejuvenation 
across level of DevEO (95% confidence interval) 
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Introduction 
 This chapter begins by discussing the findings of the director capital-
organizational rejuvenation relationship and then considers the moderating role of 
entrepreneurial orientation.  The next section highlights a number of theoretical and 
practical implications of the dissertation.  Finally, a discussion of the study’s limitations 
follows, laying the groundwork for future research opportunities related to corporate 
governance and corporate entrepreneurship. 
 
Discussion of Findings 
 Corporate governance and corporate entrepreneurship are increasingly 
recognized as critical factors in achieving a competitive advantage and enhancing firm 
performance (Corbett et al., 2013; Covin and Kuratko, 2010).  Yet, our understanding of 
how boards of directors influence corporate entrepreneurship decisions and actions has 
been limited.  In this dissertation, I developed a resource dependence theoretical 
framework to suggest that corporations can leverage directors’ experience and networks 
to be more entrepreneurial.  Although directors serve an important monitoring and 
controlling function on behalf of shareholders (Daily et al., 2003), they also serve as 
valuable resources in the firm’s decision-making process.  By introducing a new 
measure of organizational rejuvenation, I investigated whether or not director human 
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capital and social capital had a meaningful influence on firms’ ongoing changes to 
internal structures, processes, and capabilities. 
 
Director Capital and Organizational Rejuvenation 
 Surprisingly, higher levels of director CEO experience on the board have a 
negative effect on organizational rejuvenation across firms.  Thus, corporations with 
more CEOs on their boards of directors exhibit less organizational rejuvenation than 
firms with fewer CEO directors.  I expected that CEO directors’ previous experience 
with realigning their organizations for more flexibility and having the final decision-
making authority on strategic issues would transfer over as a positive influence on the 
focal firms’ organizational rejuvenation decisions.  However, the analytical results 
suggest the opposite effect.  Perhaps boards with stronger CEO experience are less likely 
to recommend drastic structural changes because they have been successful with a more 
conservative approach in their firms.  This could result from an unwillingness to think 
outside of the box.  In addition, not all CEO experience is the same, particularly when 
considering the divergent nature of the roles in different industries.  CEOs of firms in 
rapidly evolving industries likely take a different approach to organizational 
rejuvenation than those of corporations in a more stable environment.  Some prior 
studies have found that previous CEO expertise did not have a significant effect on 
directors’ ability to influence decisions (Stevenson and Radin, 2009) and did not have a 
meaningful impact on high-level corporate decisions within the responsibilities of the 
board (Fahlenbrach, Low, and Stulz, 2010).  In the case of this study, stronger CEO 
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experience among directors had a significant negative effect on firms’ organizational 
rejuvenation efforts.  This is an intriguing finding that can be further explored in the 
corporate entrepreneurship literature. 
 Another interesting result is that director social capital does not have any 
significant direct effect on firms’ organizational rejuvenation.  I expected a higher rate of 
concurrent board memberships would expose directors to new approaches and 
perspectives to help foster innovation at the focal firm (Cao et al., 2015).  Prior research 
has demonstrated that social capital affects the advice and counsel offered by directors 
(Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Westphal, 1999) and also influences decision-making 
(Johnson et al., 2013; Oh et al., 2006).  Directors who concurrently serve on another 
board observe firsthand the decision making of their peers (Westphal et al., 2001, p. 
719), resulting in decision-making scripts that directors may reflexively enact at the 
focal corporation (Scott, 1995; Westphal et al., 2001).  Perhaps this study’s insignificant 
effect of concurrent board memberships stems from the fact that more does not 
necessarily mean more relevant.  Directors who concurrently serve on other boards 
certainly increase the number of interactions with other decision makers, but board 
decisions made at other organizations may not be related to corporate entrepreneurship 
in general or organizational rejuvenation in particular.  In addition, directors who serve 
on boards that have a difficult time making a decision may be less willing to suggest 
potential solutions at the focal firm. 
 As expected, director human capital has a stronger effect on organizational 
rejuvenation than does director social capital.  This finding has interesting implications 
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for decision makers of large, established corporations.  Based on the sample frame of the 
S&P 500, I expected directors’ human capital (what they know) to have a stronger 
influence on corporate decision-making than their social capital (who they know).  
Larger and more established firms tend to have more complexity across business units 
and divisions, emphasizing the importance of directors’ previous knowledge, skills, and 
experiences during the decision-making process.  On the other hand, smaller and 
younger firms face the liability of newness (Politis, 2005; Stinchcombe, 1965) and tend 
to rely heavily on social networks and connections, emphasizing the importance of 
directors’ ties to external organizations and other directors.  Perhaps a future research 
study could further explore this difference between human and social capital with a 
sample frame of newer, smaller firms like the Inc. 500, the fastest-growing private 
companies in the United States.  It would be interesting to see if director social capital 
has a stronger effect than human capital on decision-making in these smaller firms. 
 
Director Capital, Entrepreneurial Orientation, and Organizational Rejuvenation 
 Prior research has demonstrated that entrepreneurial orientation helps to shape 
the firm’s growth and adaptation (Cao et al., 2015; Covin and Slevin, 1989) and to 
stimulate effective corporate entrepreneurship and organizational performance (Dess and 
Lumpkin, 2005).  In addition, the organizational context is a contributing factor to the 
firm’s entrepreneurial orientation posture (Cao et al., 2015; Covin et al., 2006).  Thus, 
the entrepreneurial orientation of firms should be a relevant contextual factor in how 
director human and social capital influence firms’ corporate entrepreneurship decisions.  
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I expected that in firms with a stronger entrepreneurial orientation, the benefits of 
director capital for the firm’s organizational rejuvenation would be even stronger.  Firms 
committed to a corporate-level strategy of entrepreneurial orientation should be more 
adept at seeking and implementing director feedback because they understand the 
importance of continuous innovation.  However, the interaction of director CEO 
experience and entrepreneurial orientation had no significant effect on firms’ 
organizational rejuvenation, whereas the interaction of concurrent board memberships 
and entrepreneurial orientation had a negative effect on organizational rejuvenation. 
Surprisingly, higher levels of social capital and entrepreneurial orientation 
negatively influence organizational rejuvenation within firms.  Perhaps the benefits of 
being exposed to other directors’ perspectives and decision-making styles are 
outweighed by the drawbacks of less attention to and focus on the focal firm.  Directors 
may be stretched too thin with competing obligations and priorities for several board 
commitments.  Prior research has demonstrated that directors serving on multiple boards 
are too busy to adequately focus on the focal firm (Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard, 
2003; Jackling and Johl, 2009; Johnson et al., 2013) and are associated with poorer firm 
performance (Johnson et al., 2013).  Alternatively, directors concurrently serving on 
multiple boards may find it more difficult to reach consensus on the best path forward 
for the focal firm.  Greater exposure to strategic decision making at external firms could 
lead to conflicting viewpoints and recommendations among directors on the focal board, 
resulting in indecisiveness and a bias toward the status quo.  As entrepreneurial 
orientation gets stronger and the average level of concurrent board service increases 
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within firms, perhaps firm decision-makers are less inclined to pursue organizational 
rejuvenation because they are more focused on being innovative and proactive externally 
– in ways that do not rejuvenate the internal processes, structures, or capabilities of the 
organization itself. 
 
Implications 
 This dissertation contributes to literature and practice in four primary ways.  
First, there is a significant gap in understanding the link between corporate governance 
and corporate entrepreneurship, in particular how a firm’s board and structure choices 
can affect the execution of corporate entrepreneurship initiatives (Corbett et al., 2013).  
Scholars recently have called for additional research to uncover how the composition of 
boards of directors, the role of outside directors, and firms’ efforts in attracting and 
cultivating the right human and social capital among their directors can enable 
continuous corporate entrepreneurial efforts and improved performance (Corbett et al., 
2013; Phan et al., 2009).  Prior studies have uncovered significant corporate 
entrepreneurship findings by investigating samples of lower-level employees, middle 
managers, top management teams, and even CEOs (Behrens and Patzelt, 2016; Byrne, 
Delmar, Fayolle, and Lamine, 2016; Hornsby et al., 2002; Hornsby et al., 2009; Hughes 
and Mustafa, 2016; Ling, Simsek, Lubatkin, and Veiga, 2008), but there is a lack of 
research at the board of directors level of analysis.  This dissertation contributes to the 
literature gap by demonstrating that board composition matters for firms’ corporate 
entrepreneurship initiatives.  In addition, the contextual influence of entrepreneurial 
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orientation on the relationship between corporate governance and corporate 
entrepreneurship provides an interesting result that can be further explored in future 
research efforts. 
 Second, prior corporate governance research has focused extensively on agency 
theory but has lacked attention to resource dependence theoretical frameworks (Daily et 
al., 2003).  The agency approach has emphasized the monitoring and controlling 
functions that directors provide on corporate boards instead of highlighting the equally 
important advice and counsel roles that directors bring to bear during their board service.  
“Boards of directors serve two important functions for organizations: monitoring 
management on behalf of shareholders and providing resources” (Hillman and Dalziel, 
2003, p. 383).  Resource dependence theory argues that directors are providers of 
resources for the firm (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) by 
leveraging their human and social capital to influence firm strategy, decisions, and 
performance.  In addition, firms can strategically alter board composition to enable 
necessary strategic changes and decisions (Hillman et al., 2000).  Scholars have called 
for additional studies that disentangle the human and social capital of directors from a 
resource dependence theoretical framework (Hillman et al., 2009).  “In future research 
scholars may yield more productive results by focusing on the assistance directors 
provide in bringing valued resources to the firm and in serving as a source of advice and 
counsel for CEOs” (Daily et al., 2003, p. 375) instead of focusing on directors’ 
monitoring and control function.  This dissertation contributes to the literature by 
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extending a resource dependence framework that investigates the different effects of 
director human capital and social capital on firms’ organizational rejuvenation efforts. 
 Third, prior studies have significantly advanced the five constructs of strategic 
entrepreneurship in theoretical models (Morris et al., 2007), but researchers have 
struggled to empirically test these constructs given the lack of specific measures.  This 
study adds to existing literature by introducing a straightforward way to empirically 
measure and test organizational rejuvenation, which is the firms’ ongoing changes to 
internal structures, processes, and capabilities to improve strategy execution (Covin and 
Miles, 1999; Dess et al., 2003; Kuratko and Audretsch, 2009).  The target of innovation 
is the organization itself (Covin and Miles, 1999).  Prior research has largely addressed 
the strategic entrepreneurship constructs external to the firm, particularly strategic 
renewal (Agarwal and Helfat, 2009), so the investigation of internal firm changes 
through organizational rejuvenation serves as a meaningful complement to the existing 
strategic entrepreneurship literature.  In addition, prior studies that use subjective, 
survey-based measures have produced highly relevant and impactful results, but there is 
a lack of research that incorporates objective, archival measures of corporate 
entrepreneurship.  This dissertation contributes to the literature by introducing a new 
archival measure of organizational rejuvenation.  This objective measure from readily 
available secondary data on U.S. public corporations can be used in future research 
studies to continue investigating antecedents to and outcomes of firm-level corporate 
entrepreneurship. 
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 Fourth, this dissertation offers interesting practical implications for corporate 
managers.  The analytical results indicate that a higher percentage of directors with CEO 
experience has a negative effect on the firm’s organizational rejuvenation efforts.  In 
addition, as the average number of concurrent board seats increases and the firm’s 
entrepreneurial orientation gets stronger, the firm’s organizational rejuvenation 
decreases.  As a result, corporate CEOs who intend to shake things up internally and 
make changes to organizational structures, processes, and capabilities may want to 
intentionally seek out director candidates who do not have CEO experience and are not 
concurrently serving on several other boards of directors.  Further, the analytical results 
show that director human capital has a stronger effect on organizational rejuvenation 
than does director social capital, supporting the notion that what directors know is more 
meaningful for large, established corporations than who they know.  Corporate CEOs 
and senior management members should keep in mind that the skills and experiences 
directors bring to the decision-making process have a stronger effect on organizational 
rejuvenation than their ties to external organizations and network connections. 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
 As with all research, this dissertation has its limitations.  First, although the 
research design allows for the evaluation of relationships over several years, it does not 
provide the ability to draw direct causal inferences among the variables.  The reality is 
that numerous factors influence firms’ corporate entrepreneurship decisions and actions; 
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therefore, the findings from this study add new insights to the director capital and 
corporate entrepreneurship knowledge domains but do not suggest causation. 
Second, the sample includes only large, publicly traded corporations in the 
United States.  This not only presents a selection effect but also precludes 
generalizability of the findings to small, private firms.  Future research could investigate 
the role of director human and social capital in promoting corporate entrepreneurship in 
smaller, younger organizations. 
Third, the sample frame immediately follows a severe financial crisis and 
recession in the United States economy.  The Great Recession lasted, officially, from 
December 2007 to June 2009 and continued to be felt months later.  Corporate decisions 
during the sample frame of 2010 to 2014 certainly were influenced by this major event.  
Perhaps future research that investigates the time period before, during, and after the 
financial crisis could uncover significant insights related to this dissertation’s variables 
of interest. 
Fourth, the new measure of organizational rejuvenation proposed in this study 
reflects changes in business segment revenue.  Although the degree of business segment 
concentration can serve as a good measure for internal structures and capabilities of each 
firm, I acknowledge that changes in business segment revenues are affected by many 
other factors in addition to intentional organizational rejuvenation.  This is a limiting 
aspect of the publicly reported information, which only includes business segment 
breakouts in terms of revenue. 
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Fifth, it is likely that the exact measures chosen for director human capital and 
social capital made a difference in the subsequent results.  As noted earlier, previous 
operationalizations of these director capital variables have differed greatly from study to 
study.  This dissertation implemented director CEO experience and concurrent board 
memberships as the variables of interest, but perhaps other operationalizations such as 
industry experience, financial expertise, business ties, or director social standing would 
yield alternative outcomes.  This offers interesting avenues for future research. 
Sixth, the entrepreneurial orientation measure is derived from public-facing 
language chosen by each firm.  It is possible that corporate managers intentionally 
convey a certain image in the annual report business section by carefully selecting the 
language used to describe the firm.  The business section covers items such as company 
background, business strategy, business organization and segments, products and 
services, markets and distribution, customers, and competition.  This public reputation 
bias has been pointed out by prior research regarding letters to the shareholders from the 
CEO or Board Chair.  However, the broader scope and length of the annual report 
business section makes it less likely that managers are deliberately crafting a public 
image of the firm. 
Seventh, entrepreneurial orientation is just one of many potential moderators of 
the corporate governance-corporate entrepreneurship link.  The investigation of other 
theoretically expected moderators presents numerous future research opportunities for 
the corporate entrepreneurship literature.  Finally, an interesting outcome of this 
dissertation was that director human capital made a significant difference between firms 
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whereas director social capital and entrepreneurial orientation made a significant 
difference within firms.  This difference could be further theorized and tested in future 
studies. 
 
Conclusion 
 Based on a prior literature gap of understanding how firms’ corporate governance 
and structure choices affect the implementation of corporate entrepreneurship initiatives 
(Corbett et al., 2013), this dissertation addressed the following research question:  what 
is the role of director human and social capital in facilitating organizational 
rejuvenation and how does the entrepreneurial orientation of the firm moderate this 
relationship?  Resource dependence theory asserts that directors influence the firm 
decision-making process through the resources that they bring to bear, namely their 
human and social capital.  The results of this study suggest that director capital and firm 
entrepreneurial orientation do in fact influence corporations’ organizational rejuvenation 
efforts.  It is my hope that this dissertation advances the conversation on the important 
role that directors play in firm decision-making and extends the investigation of the 
corporate governance-corporate entrepreneurship link in future studies.  
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